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Who Needs Paper Anymore?: Rationalizing an 
Allocation of Government Responsibility for the 
Transfer of Securities 
Poonam Puri* & Gil Lan** 
Canadian federal corporate legislation contemplates that shares will be transferred by 
endorsement of paper share certificates. These provisions, now found in the Canada 
Business Corporations Act (CBCA) Part VII, were enacted in the mid-1970s to reflect 
the then current market practices. However.for the last two decades, the overwhelmingly 
prevalent commercial practice is to transfer shares by book entries without using paper 
certificates (such transfers taking place in what is called the "indirect holding system"). 
It is embarrassing to note that, despite the domination of the indirect holding system, 
until recently there have been no legislative provisions addressing this method of trans-
ferring securities. 
Recent specific provincial legislation has addressed this practice by removing respon-
sibility for securities transfers from provincial corporate legislation and placing it within 
legislation that deals exclusively with securities transfers. However, Canadian federal 
legislation has yet to respond to the ubiquitous indirect holding system for federal 
corporations. This article reviews the case law history regarding the current CBCA 
Part VII provisions and outlines the current prevailing methods of transferring securi-
ties. It then compares the operation ofCBCA Part VII to general corporate law policy 
rationales. The impact of provincial securities legislations on the CBCA is evaluated 
and the fu.ture role of the CBCA Part VII provisions is analyzed by focusing on efficiency 
concerns. Finally, responses by the Canadian federal government are evaluated and 
two possible solutions are offered as rational and efficient responses under the current 
circumstances. 
Les Lois federates canadiennes sur Les societes prevoient que les actions sont transferees 
par l'endossement de certificats d'actions papiers. Ces dispositions, qui figurent 
maintenant dans la Loi canadienne sur les societes par actions ( LCSA). ont ete adoptees 
dans le milieu des annees 1970 afin de rejleter les pratiques du marche alors en vigueur. 
Toutefois, au cours des deux demieres decennies, la pratique commerciale predominante 
est de ne plus utiliser de certificats papiers, mais plut6t de transferer les actions au 
moyen d'inscriptions en compte aupres d'intermediaires en valeurs mobilieres (le 
« systeme de detention indirect » ). 11 est genant de noter qu 'en depit de la predominance 
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du systeme de detention indirect, ii n'y a eu, jusqu'a recemment. aucune disposition 
legislative traitant de ce mode de transfert des valeurs mobilieres. 
Une loi provinciale recente traite de cette pratique a l'interieur non pas d'une loi sur 
les societes mais dans une legislation portant exclusivement sur le transfert de valeurs 
mobilieres. IA legislation federale canadienne se doit de repondre au systeme de 
detention indirect, egalement omnipresent au sein des socit!tes f ederales. Le present 
article examine la jurisprudence concemant les dispositions actuelles de la Partie VII 
de la LCSA et fail ressortir les modes de transfert de valeurs mobilieres qui prevalent 
actuellement. JI compare ensuite le fonctionnement de la Partie VII de la LCSA par 
rapport aux fondements des pratiques regissant le droit des societes en general. 
L'incidence des Lois sur les valeurs mobilieres provinciales sur la LCSA fail l'objet 
d'une evaluation par Les auteurs et le role eventuel des dispositions de la Partie VII de 
la LCSA est analyse en mettant /'accent sur les questions d'efficience. Finalement, les 
reactions du gouvernement federal canadien sont evaluees et deux pistes de solution 
sont explorees relativement a ces reactions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The objectives of this article are threefold. First, it undertakes a 
brief historical overview of the present Canada Business Corporations 
Act (CBCA) Part VII provisions (enacted in the mid 1970s), including 
an overview of how the present provisions operate to create negotiable 
corporate securities as well as a summary of the case law decided under 
CBCA Part VII. Second, it analyzes the policy rationale of CBCA Part 
VII and compares this to both current security transfer practices as well 
as the latest provincial legislative initiatives regarding securities transfer. 
Based upon this, there is a critical analysis of CBCA Part VII in light of 
the CBCA policy rationales and the impact of provincial securities trans-
fer legislation. From the critical analysis, the article suggests the role of 
CBCA Part VII for the future. Third, based upon the foregoing discus-
sions, the article then makes recommendations regarding how the federal 
government might approach CBCA Part VII given some of the proce-
dural obstacles and practical concerns that exist. 
This article proceeds as follows. Part 2 reviews the history of the 
present CBCA Part VII provisions in light of the market practices at the 
time of their enactment and notes the particular influence that American 
legislative action had on the process. This part offers an overview of the 
provisions of CBCA Part VII with particular emphasis on how the 
negotiability provisions function to enhance the free flow of corporate 
securities. The case law relating to CBCA Part VII is reviewed and 
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analyzed and case law under Ontario's corporate statute is briefly com-
pared. 
Part 3 examines the policy rationale behind CBCA Part VII and 
proposes a bifurcated model whereby CBCA Part VII addresses two 
distinct sets of policy rationales of (a) supportive and administrative 
functions, and (b) market supporting and efficiency functions. In this 
part of the article, CBCA Part VII is also evaluated in light of current 
market practices relating to securities transfer. In particular, the pre-
vailing indirect holding system is a focus of the article. Current provin-
cial legislative initiatives regarding securities transfer are explored with 
a view to how they interact with CBCA Part VII. Finally, Part 3 conducts 
a critical analysis of CBCA Part VII as it relates to (a) the CBCA's 
policy rationales, and (b) the impact of provincial legislative initiatives. 
Part 3 also suggests a future role for CBCA Part Vil 
Part 4 draws upon the analysis in Part 3 and reviews the various 
factors that facilitate or hinder changes to the CBCA. Based upon this, 
as well as an analysis of provincial initiatives, four possible options for 
amending the CBCA are presented. Of these four options, two are sug-
gested as being optimal solutions for the CBCA. Part 5 concludes. 
2. CBCA PART VII PROVISIONS - BRIEF HISTORY, 
SUMMARY OVERVIEW AND CASE LAW 
(a) Brief History 
The current CBCA Part VII provisions relate to the topic of security 
certificates, registers and transfers. These provisions were originally 
enacted in the mid-1970s1 and were intended to bring the CBCA into 
line with the then current market practices. 
Prior to the current CBCA Part VII provisions, the share certificate 
itself was only a representation of what was written in the corporation's 
shareholder register. The definitive source of shareholder rights was the 
actual shareholder register and supporting documentation (usually con-
tained in the corporation minute book and consisting of documents such 
1 These provisions were introduced in the Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1970, C-32, 
which was the predecessor to the Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 
33. Later, those provisions were re-enacted substantially in the same form in Canada 
Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 [CBCA). 
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as subscriptions for shares, and directors' resolutions issuing or trans-
ferring shares). The important implication of all this is that share certif-
icates could not be relied upon. If the shareholder register was different 
from the share certificate, then the shareholder register prevailed.2 
Although the share certificate was merely a derivative piece of 
written evidence of what was contained in the shareholder register, in 
actual commercial practice, share certificates were treated as if they 
were negotiable instruments. 3 Generally speaking, a negotiable instru-
ment allows a person, known as a transferee, who acquires an instrument 
(e.g., a cheque or, in this case, a share certificate), to obtain potentially 
better title to the instrument than his/her predecessors. For example, if 
the transferor had a defect in his/her title to the instrument, the transferee 
could obtain clear title to the instrument if the transferee had (a) no 
notice of any defect, (b) given valuable consideration for the instrument, 
and (c) acted in good faith. 
Accordingly, there was a clear conflict between "law on the books" 
and accepted commercial practice. Technically, according to the law at 
the time, share certificates were simply written evidence of shareholder 
register entries and nothing more. One could not rely upon them. How-
ever, in commercial practice, by treating share certificates as negotiable 
instruments, innocent transferees could in fact rely upon them. 
Thus, Canadian federal corporate law was amended to account for 
generally accepted commercial practices. At the time of amendment, the 
Canadian government borrowed heavily from Article 8 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code ("UCC"). The UCC is a model piece of legislation in 
the United States and was developed by two private organizations, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the 
American Law Institute. Since the UCC was developed by private or-
ganizations, it does not officially have the force of law by itself. How-
ever, since it has been substantially adopted by the legislatures of vir-
tually all of the states in the U.S.A., the UCC is often synonymous with 
the actual law of the state. Ever since the original 1952 edition of the 
2 For a more detailed historical account see Bruce Welling, Corporate I.Aw in Canada, 2nd 
ed. (Toronto: Butterworths Canada Ltd., 1991) at 70 I-7rJJ. 
-• Ibid., at 702. Welling cites case law establishing that, even though the share certificates 
were not actually negotiable instruments, the courts were willing to side with an innocent 
transferee. In effect then, this turned the share certificates into something like a negotiable 
instrument. 
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UCC, the UCC has evolved with amendments developed by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") 
and the American Law Institute ("ALf'). 
The UCC consists of nine numbered articles and each article deals 
with a major substantive area of commercial law.4 Article 8 deals spe-
cifically with investment securities and it is this part of the UCC that the 
federal government borrowed heavily from when enacting the amend-
ments to CBCA. The overall effect of Canadian federal corporate law 
amendments in the mid- l 970s was ''to confer upon the investment se-
curities of a corporation a negotiable or (perhaps more accurately) quasi-
negotiable character, so as to facilitate dealings in those securities in 
established securities exchanges and other markets."' Those amend-
ments were substantially re-enacted in 19856 and have remained the 
same up until the present. 
(b) Overview of Part VII Provisions 
Part VII of the CBCA consists of sections 48 to 81 inclusive. 
Although a comprehensive review of each section is beyond the scope 
of this article, Part VII can be effectively summarized.7 The general 
purpose of this part of the CBCA is to govern the transfer or transmission 
of a security. 8 The definition of a security under the CBCA is fairly 
broad although restricted to instruments issued by a corporation.9 In 
•Text of the UCC Articles can be accessed online: <http://www.Jaw.cornell.edu/ucc/ 
ucc.table.htrnl>. In summary, the topics the UCC Articles relate to arc Article l -General 
Provisions, Article 2 - Sales, Article 2A - Leases, Article 3 - Negotiable Instruments, 
Article 4 - Bank Deposits, Article 4A - Funds Transfers, Article S - Letters of Credit, 
Article 6 - Bulk Transfers and Bulk Sales, Article 7 - Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading 
and other documents of title, Article 8 - Investment Securities, and Article 9 - Secured 
Transactions. 
5 Kevin P. McGuiness, The Law and Practice of Canadian Business Corporations (Toronto: 
Butterworths Canada Ltd., 1999) at 587. 
6 Supra, n. I. 
7 For a more detailed and section by section description of CBCA Part VII provisions, see H. 
Sutherland, ed., Fraser's Handbook on Canadian Company Law, 8th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 
1994). 
• CBCA, supra, n. l, s. 48(1 ). 
• Section 48(2) of the CBCA, ibid., states that a "security" or "security certificate" means an 
instrument issued by a corporation that is 
(a) in bearer, order or registered form, 
(b) of a type commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or markets or commonly 
recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment, 
(c) one of a class or series or by its terms divisible into a class or series of instruments, 
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contrast, the definition of a security under the Securities Act (Ontario) 
is much broader and includes items as diverse as a document constituting 
evidence of an interest in scholarship or educational plan or trust. 10 
Also related to Part VII are sections located in other parts of the 
CBCA that also deal with restrictions on transfer. These sections state 
if there are ownership, issue, or transfer restrictions then these are to be 
noted in the articles of incorporation 11 and if the articles of incorporation 
are to be amended such that there is a change, addition, or deletion of 
such restrictions, then such an amendment requires a special resolution 
of the shareholders. 12 
Essentially, Part VII of the CBCA is a self-contained set of transfer 
rules for corporate securities that has the effect of turning corporate 
securities into negotiable instruments (except where there are transfer 
restrictions noted on the security certificate). 13 In addition, there are 
some general rules of an administrative nature regarding (a) the rights 
of a holder to have a security certificate or written acknowledgement of 
such a right, (b) the contents of a share certificate, restrictions noted on 
a certificate, and other fonnalities, 14 and (c) the establishment of a se-
curities register in which the names of shareholders and number of shares 
held are kept. 15 
In the establishing this code of transfer rules, there are two key 
concepts: "adverse claim" and "bona fide purchaser." 16 An adverse claim 
includes a claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful or that a 
particular adverse person has an interest in the security. A bona fide 
purchaser means as purchaser for value in good faith and without any 
notice of any adverse claim who takes delivery of a security in the proper 
form. The key idea here is that a bona fide purchaser takes a security 
free and clear of any adverse claims, 17 subject to a few exceptions. This 
and 
( d) evidence of a share, panicipation or other interest in or obligation of a corporation. 
w Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S5, s. I [OSA]. 
11 CBCA, supra, n. I, s. 6(d). 
12 Ibid .• s. 174. 
" Ibid .• s. 48(3). 
14 Ibid .• s. 49. 
" Ibid., s. 50. 
1
• Ibid .• s. 48(2): these definitions are a key part of the negotiable nature of security certificates 
established under this pan. 
17 Ibid .• s. 60. 
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concept allows for the freer flow of corporate securities by minimizing 
the number of inquiries that an innocent transferee must make regarding 
the corporate securities in question. 
The CBCA sets up a number of more detailed rules that support 
the general concept of negotiability of corporate securities. Certain ev-
identiary presumptions, such as presumptions as to validity of signatures, 
are set out.18 Lack of a genuine certificate may defeat a bona fide pur-
chaser19 and a bona fide purchaser may be deemed to have notice of an 
adverse claim under certain circumstances including where terms are 
noted on the security2() or where there are particular endorsements on 
the security.21 The CBCA also provides for warranties given to the 
purchaser and issuer as well as warranties given by intermediaries, 
pledges, and brokers. 22 
There is also a set of rules regarding the types of endorsement that 
may be used to transfer a security (e.g., special endorsement, blank 
endorsement, etc.) as well as definitions of the appropriate persons who 
may make such endorsements (e.g., person specified on the security, or 
a person acting under an applicable power of attomey).23 
Another key idea that completes this self-contained transfer code 
is the concept of the issuer being under a duty to register a transfer. If 
all the formalities have been properly complied with (e.g., proper en-
dorsement) and the transfer is rightful or to a bona fide purchaser, then 
the issuer is under a general obligation to register the transfer on the 
books. 24 This important concept ties the security certificate (which is a 
negotiable instrument) to substantive rights. A bona fide purchaser can 
obtain a security certificate free and clear of adverse claims. In tum, as 
long as the proper procedures have been met, the bona fide purchaser 
can then require the issuer to register the transfer on the securities 
register. 
18 Ibid., s. 53. 
19 Ibid., s. 55(3). 
20 Ibid., s. 55(1 ). 
21 Ibid., s. 61(1). 
22 Ibid., s. 63. 
23 Ibid., s. 65. 
24 Ibid., s. 76(1). Note that the issuer may require reasonable assurance the endorsement is 
genuine. In addition, the issuer may deny the registration if it is under a duty to inquire into 
an adverse claim Such duties to inquire are rather limited and found in s. 78 of the CBCA. 
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The above concept is important because, if the corporate security 
certificates are negotiable, then the issuer does not necessarily know 
who is the lawful holder of the corporate security certificate at any time. 
There may have been many endorsements and transfers of the security 
certificate, without any notice to the issuer. As far as the issuer is con-
cerned, it only knows who it has listed on the securities register as a 
shareholder. Thus, if a bona fide purchaser for value desires to exercise 
the rights associated with the securities in question, then it needs to have 
the transfer registered on the securities register. 
In addition to the administrative and negotiable instrument provi-
sions, it should be noted that Part VII also plays an important role with 
respect to the transmission of corporate securities. Transmissions refer 
to a transfer of corporate securities that is founded primarily by operation 
by some rule of law as opposed to the voluntary and consensual agree-
ment of two parties. Transmissions often arise in the case of deceased 
persons, infants, mentally incompetent persons, missing persons, or 
bankrupts. Under such circumstances, the CBCA allows particular per-
sons to be the constructive registered holder.2s 
Thus, it is clear that Part VII of the CBCA contains a variety of 
provisions relating to security certificates. Although the amendments in 
the mid-1970s introduced provisions that gave legal recognition to the 
practice of treating corporate securities as negotiable instruments, Part 
VII contains more than that. It also contains the basic administrative 
provisions that support the creation of security certificates and security 
registries. In addition, Part VII also deals with the fairly important topic 
of transmission of securities. With respect to the negotiable nature of 
corporate securities, Part VII provides a fairly detailed and self-con-
tained set of rules governing the transfer of corporate securities that 
include evidentiary presumptions, key definitions such as bona fide 
purchaser and adverse claim, rules regarding endorsement and appro-
priate signatures, warranties of various key persons, as well as rules 
regarding the duties of issuers and the registration of transfers. 
25 Ibid .. s. 51 (2). Also see s. 51 (7) which sets the procedural and evidentiary requirements in 
order for a person to become a constructive registered holder. 
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(c) Case Law Relating to Part VII of the CBCA 
A search for cases where the courts had judicially considered the 
provisions of Part VII of the CBCA revealed that there have been very 
few court judgments that considered these provisions in a significant 
way. Relatively speaking, the number of reported cases is very few and 
there are approximately twenty court cases that made reference to the 
provisions of CBCA Part VII. The vast majority of those court cases 
make only cursory references to CBCA Part VII provisions and did not 
consider them in a significant way. Although there may be some differ-
ences of opinion as to how many cases substantively considered CBCA 
Part VII provisions, a fair estimate would be that about five or so cases 
have actually made significant reference to the CBCA Part VII provi-
sions over the past thirty-one years. In contrast, other sections of the 
CBCA such as the oppression remedy (under s. 241 of the CBCA) have 
had much greater judicial scrutiny.26 
Below, this article briefly discusses some of the more significant 
decisions relating to CBCA Part VII. An overall review of the case law 
reveals that the more mundane and administrative provisions relating to 
security certificates and transmissions have neither received much ju-
dicial attention nor have they been the subject of heated litigation. As 
could be expected, it has been the provisions regarding the negotiability 
of corporate securities that have received judicial consideration. 
One leading case is Javelin International Ltd. (Receiver of) v. Hill-
ier, 21 which dealt with a person who had share certificates endorsed in 
blank and received them as a gift. The person had requested that the 
corporation register the transfer on the securities registry of the corpo-
ration. In this case, the court also dealt with the issue of the validity of 
shares issued for inadequate or improper consideration. 
In Javelin, the court clearly laid down a number of firm statements 
with respect to share certificates and the negotiability principles of Part 
VII of the CBCA. 
26 See Poonam Puri & Stephanie Ben-lshai, "The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially 
Considered: An Empirical Analysis" (2004) 30 Queen's L.J. 79, for an empirical analysis 
of a sample of seventy-one cases over a seven-year period. 
r1 (1988), (sub nom. Javelin International Lile, Re) (1988) R.J.Q. 1846, 40 B.L.R. 249, EYB 
1988-86756, 1988 CarswellQue 28, (1988) Q.J. No. 928 (Que. S.C.) [Javelin]. 
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• A donee is a purchaser under the CBCA but is not the same 
as a "bona fide purchaser''. In particular, a bona fide pur-
chaser gives value for the security. This does not mean that 
a donee cannot have title to security. It simply means that, 
unlike a bona fide purchaser, a donee cannot acquire better 
title than the donor. 
• It is possible for shares issued illegally or for inadequate I 
improper consideration to become a valid instrument where 
a purchaser for value obtains the share without notice of any 
defect going to its validity. 
• More precisely, the CBCA has turned share certificates into 
negotiable instruments subject only to limitations where the 
restrictions are noted on the face of the share certificate itself. 
• Even if the person in possession of the share certificate is a 
donee (i.e., not a bona fide purchaser), such a person may 
nevertheless require the transfer to be registered on the books 
if the transfer was rightful. However, rightful means more 
than "not wrongful". Viewing the CBCA as a whole, the 
court concluded that transfers should not be registered where 
to do so would be to ratify a known or apparent illegality I 
irregularity. In addition, where an adverse claim is known to 
exist, a transfer should not be registered. Thus, a transfer is 
rightful only if it is requested by person who had no knowl-
edge of adverse claims and acquired the security in good 
faith from someone who had good title. Any knowledge of 
a defect in the transferor's title would not be good faith and 
would prevent a transfer from being registered. 
In the Javelin case, the court found the testimony of the person 
requesting the transfer to be unreliable. A transfer could only be regis-
tered if either the person was a bona fide purchaser or if the transfer was 
rightful. The person in possession of the share certificates was not a 
bona fide purchaser for value (the person received the shares as a gift) 
and could not require on transfer on that basis. Under the circumstances, 
the court was unconvinced that this person took the share certificates 
without any notice of the defects, and as a result, this person also lacked 
the good faith required for a person requesting a registration of a rightful 
transfer. 
-- -----------------------------
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In the case of Csak v. Aumon,28 the court affirmed the proposition 
that a share certificate is not actually the share itself. Invoking equitable 
principles, the court held that it is not necessary for share certificates to 
be issued for a person to be the beneficial owner of shares. In this case, 
the court found that the lack of legal title did not prevent beneficial 
owners from bringing applications under the oppression remedy provi-
sions of the CBCA. 
The case of Ultrama.r Canada Inc. v. Montreal Pipe Line Ltd. 29 
intertwines the transfer registry provisions with the duties of directors. 
The court held that, even where the articles of incorporation provided 
the directors with the discretion to refuse to register a transfer, the 
directors must exercise this discretion in good faith. Good faith in this 
context means that the directors should refuse only with a view to the 
best interests of the corporation. In this case, the court found that the 
directors refused to register the transfer in order to advance the interests 
of one group of shareholders over another and that such actions were a 
breach of the directors' duties. 
In Verdun v. Toronto Dominion Bank,'30 the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that the corporation is entitled to treat the registered owner 
of the shares as the person entitled to vote to the exclusion of all other 
persons. The corollary result of this was that it was further held that an 
unregistered beneficial shareholder would not be entitled to vote or 
submit a shareholder proposal. 
This case underscores the importance of registration of a transfer 
to a bona fide purchaser. In Javelin, registration of transfer is what the 
petitioner was seeking from the court, though it was ultimately denied 
for the reasons explained above. Further, in Ultrama.r, the directors were 
found to be in breach of their duties for wrongfully refusing to register 
a transfer. Finally, the Verdun case illustrates the important conse-
quences flowing from registration on the securities register of the cor-
poration. 31 
28 (1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 567, 1990 CarswellOnt 915, [1990) O.J. No. 534 (Ont. H.C.). 
29 (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 136, 49 B.L.R. 279, 1990 CarswellOnt 134, [1990) O.J. No. 1271 
(Ont. H.C.); supplemental reasons to be found at (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 498, 46 C.P.C. (2d) 
184, [1990) O.J. No. 1884, 1990 Carswe110nt426 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [Ultramar]. 
30 [1996) 3 S.C.R. 550, 1996 CarswellOnt 3943, 1996Carswe110nt 3944, 940.A.C. 211, 203 
N.R. 60, 139 D.L.R. (4th) 415, 28 B.L.R. (2d) 121, 12 C.C.L.S. 139 (S.C.C.) [Verdun]. 
31 For an earlier case that mentions a similar principle, see Trans-Mountain Pipeline Co. v. 
12 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [23 B.F.L.R.] 
In passing, two other cases could be noted. First, in the case of Heil 
v. T.E.N. Private Cable Systems Inc. 32 the court took a very broad and 
flexible interpretation of the definition of "transfer" under s. 48(2) of 
the CBCA in its evaluation of the meaning of "transferred after the 
record date" under s. 138(2) of the CBCA. The court noted the fact that 
the legislature provided a non-exhaustive definition of the term indicates 
that the word "transfer" was meant to be interpreted within the objects 
of any particular provision as a whole. Second, in the case of LSI Logic 
Corp. of Canada Inc. v. Logani,33 the court held that, pursuant to s. 
49( 15) and ( 16) of the CBCA, fractional shares may be acquired without 
shareholder consent. 
In summary, a review of the significant case law reveals that the 
court cases have centered on key concepts such as the definition of 
adverse claim, bona fide purchaser, transfer, and the negotiable character 
of corporate securities. Other issues that have received focus include 
how the corporation deals with registered holders as well as the duty of 
the issuer to register a transfer. Some side issues that received attention 
include the flexible definition of transfer and the topic of fractional 
shares.34 
Inland Natural Gas Co. (1983), 49 B.C.L.R. 126, B.C. Corps. L.G. 78,214, 1983 
CarswellBC 330, [1983) B.C.J. No. 1622 (B.C. C.A.), which held that so long as a person 
is listed on the securities register, such a person is entitled to any right given to it by law, 
including the right to request a meeting under the CBCA. 
"(1993), 11 B.L.R. (2d) 54, [1993) B.C.J. No. 1171, 1993 CarswellBC 520 (B.C. S.C.). 
33 204 D.L.R. (4th) 443, 2001ABQB710, 2001CarswellAlta1100, [2001) II W.W.R. 740, 
296 A.R. 201, 19 B.L.R. (3d) tot, [2001) A.J. No. to83, 96 Alta. L.R. (3d) 162 (Alta. 
Q.B.); additional reasons at (2001), 100 Alta. L.R. (3d) 49, 2001 ABQB 968, 2001 
CarswellAlta 1733, [2002) 4 W.W.R. 531, [2001] A.J. No. 1751 (Alta. Q.B.). 
14 For an excellent digest of the leading cases in these areas, refer to Wayne Gray, ed., The 
Annotated Canada Business Corporations Act (Toronto: Carswell, c.2002-) and Wayne 
Gray, ed., The Annotated Ontario Business Corporations Act (Toronto: Carswell, 
c.2003-). Both of these works were consulted in researching this article. There were other 
cases that were reviewed in the statutes judicially considered search that have not been 
discussed here because they either (a) were deemed not to contribute in a significant way 
to the jurisprudence surrounding Part VII of the CBCA for the purposes of this discussion, 
or (b) had principles that were already well covered in cases that were discussed. Cases 
that were reviewed include the following: Besnerc. I.A. Besner & Sons (Canada) Ltd., 15 
B.L.R. (2d) 261, [ 1993) R.J.Q. 1759, 1993 CarswellQue 29, EYB 1993-84141 (Que. S.C.); 
EnCana Corp. v. Douglas (2005), 2005 ABCA 439, 2005 CarswellAlta 1872, [2006) 7 
W.W.R. 59, 11 B.L.R. (4th) 198,54 Alta. L.R. (4th) 130, 2620.L.R. (4th) 279(Alta. C.A.); 
Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Canada (Director appointed under the Canada Business Corporations 
Act) (1996), 11 C.C.L.S. 2 to, t 996 CarswellOnt 2315, [ 1996) O.J. No. 2380, 6 C.P .C. (4th) 
170, (sub nom. Imperial Oil Ltd., Re) 6 O.T.C. 385 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); 
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It should be noted that the Ontario Business Corporations Act35 
(OBCA), prior to its most recent amendments in 2006, had provisions 
that were very similar to the provisions under Part VII of the CBCA. 
For the purposes of comparison, a similar search was done for case law 
that had judicially considered the analogous OBCA provisions. The 
results were very similar to the search done for CBCA case law. Ap-
proximately twenty cases were identified as having referred to the rel-
evant analogous OBCA provisions. Of these seventeen cases, roughly 
eight to ten of them could be considered as having meaningfully con-
tributed to the jurisprudence for these provisions. 36 The other cases were 
Iverson v. Westfair Foods Lid., 38 Alta. L.R. (3d) 331, (1996] 7 W.W.R. 520, 183 A.R. 
286, 28 B.L.R. (2d) 87, 1996Carswe11Alta361, [1996] A.J. No. 397 (Alta.Q.B.);affinned 
(1998), 67 Alta. L.R. (3d) 148, (1999) 4 W.W.R. 659, 1998 ABCA 337, [1998) A.J. No. 
1145, 1998 CarswellAlta 954,41 B.L.R. (2d) 83, 166 D.L.R. (4th)448, (sub nom. Westfair 
Foods Ltd. v. Wan) 223 A.R. 322, 183 W.A.C. 322 (Alta. C.A.); leave to appeal refused 
(1999), (1998) S.C.C.A. No. 634, 244 A.R. 400 (note), 2()1) W.A.C. 400 (note), 243 N.R. 
397 (note) (S.C.C.);Jacobsen v. United CansoOil & Gas Lid., 1130.L.R. (3d)427, 1980 
CarswellAlta 261, 11 B.L.R. 313, 23 A.R. 512, (1980) 6 W.W.R. 38 (Alta. Q.B.); Kiliaris 
c. R., (1996) 3 C.T.C. 2743, 1996 CarswellNat 1795, 97 D.T.C. 7, 1996 CarswellNat 2905 
(T.C.C.); affirmed (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 1806, 99 D.T.C. 5700 (Fed. C.A.); Multiple 
Access Lid. v. McCutcheon, 1982 CarswellOnt 128, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 161, 138 D.L.R. (3d) 
l, 44 N .R. 181, 18 B.L.R. 138, 1982 CarswellOnt 738 (S.C.C.); National Trust Co. v. Trans 
Mountain Pipe Line Co. (1983), 43 B.C.L.R. 239, 33 C.P.C. 163, 1983 CarswellBC 46 
(B.C. S.C.); Piller Sausages & Delicatessens Lid. v. Cobb International Corp. (2003), 
(2003) O.J. No. 2647, 35 B.L.R. (3d) 193, 2003 CarswellOnt 2430 (Ont. S.CJ.); additional 
reasons at (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 2712 (Ont. S.C.J.); affinned(2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 
5167, 179 O.A.C. 290, 40 B.L.R. (3d) 88 (Ont. C.A.); Shell Canada Ltd. v. CIBC Mellon 
Trust Co. (2003), 2003 CarswellAlta 1859, 2003 ABQB 1058, (2004) 4 W.W.R. 393, 44 
C.P.C. (5th) 336, 24 Alta. L.R. (4th) 259, 349 A.R. 276, (2003) AJ. No. 1618 (Alta. Q.B.); 
Sparling v. Javelin International Lid., (1986) R.J.Q. 476, EYB 1986-86748, 1986 
CarswellQue 352 (Que. S.C.); reversed (1992), (sub nom. Grusk c. Sparling) (1993) R.L. 
22, 1992 CarswellQue 150, 44 Q.A.C. 219 (Que. C.A.); and Striefel v. R.,(1999) 3 C.T.C. 
2684, 1999 CarswellNat 1043 (T.C.C. [lnfonnal Procedure). 
35 Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. 8.19 [OBCA]. The analogous provisions under 
the OBCA were found under ss. 53-91 and these sections were more or less analogous to 
CBCA Part VII, ss. 48-81. It is important to note that these provisions were recently 
amended in a significant way, as will be discussed later in this article. 
36 Cases that were identified as significant were Bank Leu AG v. Gaming wttery Corp. (2003), 
37 B.L.R. (3d) 1, 2003 CarswellOnt 3103, 175 O.A.C. 143, [2003) O.J. No. 3213, 231 
D.L.R. (4th) 251 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused (2004), 329 N.R. 392 (note), 2004 
CarswellOnt 1321, 2004 CarswellOnt 1322, 195 O.A.C. 398 (note) (S.C.C.); Bank Leu AG 
v. Gaming Lottery Corp. (2001), 29 B.L.R. (3d) 68, 2001 CarswellOnt 4262, (2001) 0.J. 
No. 4715 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); additional reasons at (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 
1667, (2002) 0.J. No. 2046 (Ont. S.CJ. [Commercial List]); additional reasons at (2002), 
2002 CarswellOnt 2861 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); aff'mned (2003), 2003 
CarswellOnt 3103, 175 O.A.C. 143, (2003) 0.J. No. 3213, 37 BL.R. (3d) l, 231 D.L.R. 
(4th) 251 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused (2004), 329 N.R. 392 (note), 2004 
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still noted though their contribution to the jurisprudence was arguably 
of less value. 37 Given the recent heavy amendments and deletions to the 
analogous OBCA provisions (to be discussed later in this article), the 
value of this OBCA case law to future jurisprudence is unclear. It is 
interesting to note that a jurisdiction with a high degree of commercial 
activity such as Ontario had few significant cases as well. 
3. ANALYSIS OF CBCA PART VII UNDER CURRENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
This part of the article analyzes the relevance of CBCA Part VII 
by drawing upon the previous discussion of its history, basic functions, 
and case law, and comparing that discussion to the present circumstance 
in the Canadian marketplace. In particular, emphasis will be placed upon 
(a) a discussion of the policy rationales of CBCA Part VII, (b) a review 
of the current market practices with respect to the transfer of securities, 
CarswellOnt 1321, 2004 CarswellOnt 1322, 195 O.A.C. 398 (note) (S.C.C.);BankLeuAG 
v. Gaming Lottery Corp. (2000), 6 8.L.R. (3d) 77, 2000 CarswellOnt 1707 (Ont. S.C.J.); 
leave to appeal allowed (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 4882 (Ont. Div. Ct.); reversed (2001), 
2001 CarswellOnt 893 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Evanov v. Burlington Broadcascing Inc. (1997), 29 
O.T.C. 102, 1997 CarswellOnt 1474, [1997] O.J. No. 1781 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Gillespie v. 
Retail Merchants' Assn. of Canada (Ontario) Inc. (1997), 1997 CarswellOnt 1244 (Ont. 
Gen. Div.); Peat Marwick Ltd. v. Goldfarb (1983), 40 O.R. (2d) 330, 1983 CarswellOnt 
151, 21 8.L.R. 172, 44 C.8.R. (N.S.) 174, 2 P.P.S.A.C. 237, 142 D.L.R. (3d) 470 (Ont. 
C.A.); Suddaby v. 864226 Ontario Inc. (2003), 31 8.L.R. (3d) 119, 2003 CarswellOnt 258 
(Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons at (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 3867 (Ont. S.C.J.); reversed 
(2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2512, [2004] O.J. No. 2536 (Ont. C.A.); Tam v. Can-Sling Ltd. 
(1994), [1994] O.J. No. 659, 1994 CarswellOnt 2602 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Vella-Zarb v. 
Canhorn Chemical Corp. (1996), 9 O.T.C. 182, 1996 CarswellOnt 2681 (Ont. Gen. Div.); 
and Stathakis v. York Farmers Marketing Ltd. (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 1469, 9 8.L.R. 
(4th) 107, [2004] O.J. No. 1498 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); additional reasons at 
(2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2507 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). 
37 These cases of lesser importance included: Beechwood Cemetery Co. v. Graham ( 1996), 
12 C.C.L.S. 197, 1996 CarswellOnt 2569, 8 O.T.C. 28, [1996] O.J. No. 2364 (Ont. Gen. 
Div.); additional reasons at (1996), 1996 CarswellOnt 5167, 22 O.T.C. 317 (Ont. Gen. 
Div.); affirmed (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 4905, 41 8.L.R. (2d) 186, 117 O.A.C. 71 (Ont. 
C.A.); affirmed(l998), 1998Carswell0nt4904,41 8.L.R. (2d) 171, 117 O.A.C. 59, [1998] 
O.J. No. 5289 (Ont. C.A.); Blue Resources Ltd. v. Sherriff( 1994), (sub nom. Blue Resources 
Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada (Senior Disciplinary Counsel)) 120 D.L.R. (4th) 751, 
1994 CarswellOnt 129 (Ont. Gen. Div.); additional reasons at (1994), 1994 CarswellOnt 
4217 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Cameron & Johnstone Ltd. v. Ha"op (1996), 1996 CarswellOnt 
3678 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Mian v. Kalezic (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 208 (Ont. S.C.J.); 
affirmed (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 4246 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Pomeroy (1995), [1995] O.J. 
No. 590, 1995 CarswellOnt 2888 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Sportscope Television Network Ltd. v. 
Shaw Communications Inc. ( 1999), 46 8.L.R. (2d) 87, 1999 CarswellOnt 630 (Ont. Gen. 
Div. [Commercial List]); and Teddy Bear Valley Mines Ltd., Re (1993), I C.C.L.S. 97, 
[1993] O.J. No. 1588, 1993 CarswellOnt 907 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]). 
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( c) a review of the current changes being made to provincial corporate 
statutes with respect to security transfers, and ( d) an analysis of the 
appropriate and desirable role of CBCA Part VII in light of the policy 
rationales of the CBCA as a whole as well as the foregoing points. 
(a) Policy Rationale for CBCA Part VII 
A close reading of CBCA Part VII reveals that the provisions of 
this part are actually operating at two distinct levels. 
At one basic level, the administrative provisions of CBCA Part VII create the 
legal authority for the basic book-keeping necessary to a corporation. For exam-
ple, the details regarding the creation of a securities register are clearly articu-
lated38 and the important legal consequences of transfers noted on the securities 
register are set forth. 39 1bere are also details about the form of share certificates. 40 
The provisions concerning transmission fulfill an important role by setting forth 
who may act as a registered holder in circumstances where the actual registered 
holder is unable to act (e.g., deceased, mentally incompetent, etc.).41 Thus, at this 
level, the CBCA Part VII provisions provide some of the required structure so 
that shareholders may exercise their rights under corporate law. In this sense, 
these provisions are supportive of the basic tenet that corporate law should assist 
the exercise of rights by shareholders. 
However, the amendments to the Canada Corporations Act (the 
predecessor to the CBCA), in the mid-1970s, created a second dimension 
to the CBCA Part VII provisions, which inherited such amendments. As 
discussed above, these amendments were introduced to reflect the al-
ready ongoing market practice of treating security or share certificates 
as negotiable instruments. 42 Turning share certificates into negotiable 
instruments had the effect of increasing the marketability of share cer-
tificates by allowing such instruments to flow more freely from one 
person to another. As long as one was a bona fide purchaser for value, 
38 CBCA, supra, n. l, s. 50(1). 
39 Section 51 ( 1) of the CBCA, ibid., states that, aside from a few exceptions, the corporation 
may treat the registered owner of a security as the person exclusively entitled to vote, to 
receive notices, to receive any interest, dividend, or other payments in respect of the security, 
and otherwise to exercise all the rights and powers of an owner of the security. This was 
illustrated in the Verdun case, supra, n. 30. 
40 See s. 49 of the CBCA generally, ibid. 
41 See s. 51 (7) of the CBCA, ibid. 
•
2 Supra, n. 2. Professor Welling notes that, in certain court cases, judges would also treat 
share certificates as negotiable instruments. Although the judges did not necessarily use 
the terminology of "negotiable instruments" they tended to favor the innocent transferee 
using available legal constructs to support such a result. The end result was that the share 
certificates had the same effect as if they were negotiable instruments. Welling notes, in 
particular, the case of Smith v. Rogers (1899), 30 O.R. 256 (Ont. C.A.). 
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one was relatively certain that one had obtained title to the security 
certificate. 
A key point to note here is that the amendments were introduced 
to merely reflect market practices that were already in existence and 
generally well accepted by the financial community. As has been noted: 
The purpose of the C.B.C.A. rules, and of Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code from which they were adapted, was to provide a legal basis for the existing 
market treatment of corporate securities. The rules were designed to permit reli-
able securities transactions with a minimum of effort wasted on title investiga-
tions, for these are conditions essential to a liquid securities market. 43 
CBCA Part VII can be viewed as a set of legal provisions designed 
to support market efficiency by providing more legal certainty to wide-
spread and prevailing market practices. This change was efficient, not 
only because the marketplace had adopted these practices, but also 
because the substantive practices themselves created a more fluid market 
for securities. The amendments were not viewed as an intrusive attempt 
by government to impose a regime of transacting. Rather, they were 
accepted with open arms as providing the necessary legal certainty to 
well-accepted market practices. 
There are also two more reasons why the amendments could be 
viewed, at the time, as efficient and transaction enhancing. First, by 
borrowing heavily from UCC Article 8, the Canadian parliament made 
a significant step towards an attempt at harmonizing legislation with the 
United States, an important trade partner for Canada as well as one of 
the leading financial centres in the world. Second, the amendments 
assisted in detailing transfer provisions for corporate securities in one 
place and, in comparison to the prior state of affairs, provided a more 
manageable state of affairs. This is not to suggest that the present CBCA 
Part VII provisions are a comprehensive code or "one stop shop" for 
legal provisions relating to corporate securities. Indeed, it has been noted 
that, depending on the type of institution involved (e.g., bank, insurance 
company, loan and trust company, or cooperative credit associations), 
different sets oflegislative rules may apply.44 However, relatively speak-
43 Ibid. 
44 See B. Geva, "Legislative Power in Relation to Transfers of Securities: The Case for 
Provincial Jurisdiction in Canada" (2004) 19 B.F.L.R. 393 at 397, where Geva notes that 
"existing legislation is neither harmonious nor internally consistent, and its application is 
not always certain." 
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ing, it could be regarded as efficient in comparison to the prior vacuum 
of law. In short, the amendments were efficiency-enhancing for the 
period albeit far short of establishing a comprehensive and uniform law 
for corporate securities. 
Thus, the policy rationales for CBCA Part VII can actually be 
regarded as bifurcated given the fact that CBCA Part VII has two dif-
ferent functions - one relating to administrative support of the CBCA 
and the other relating to negotiability of corporate securities. With re-
spect to the administrative provisions that provide some core function-
ality, the policy rationale is fairly simple. These provisions are suppor-
tive and establish the basic records which assist shareholder in exercising 
their rights. The negotiability provisions introduced in the mid- l 970s 
have a number of policy rationales which can be summarized as: 
• supporting and legitimizing accepted, sound, and wide-
spread market practices; 
• harmonizing with important trade partners and jurisdictions; 
and 
• contributing to ease of legal reference by moving towards 
comprehensive provisions. 
(b) Current Market Practices with Respect to the Transfer of 
Securities 
In the current financial marketplace, there are two methods by 
which securities are held: the direct holding system and the indirect 
holding system. CBCA Part VII only contemplates a direct holding 
system for securities and does not have any provisions addressing the 
indirect holding system. 
The direct holding system may be viewed as the "traditional 
method" of securities holding whereby securities were transferred by 
means of a physical certificate. Transfer of a security was accomplished 
when the owner of the security endorsed the certificate in blank (usually 
by signing on the back of the certificate without naming any particular 
transferee) and delivered physical possession of the endorsed certificate 
to the purchaser. The purchaser could easily resell the certificate by 
delivering the certificate to a subsequent purchaser. Since the certificate 
was still endorsed in blank, the purchaser could transfer it to the subse-
quent purchaser. 
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At any time, a purchaser could surrender the certificate to the issuer 
(i.e., the corporation) for a new certificate (usually issued to the pur-
chaser and naming the purchaser on the front of the certificate). At the 
same time, the issuer would usually register the transfer on its securities 
register and the purchaser would now appear as the registered holder of 
the certificate. This is referred to as the "direct holding system" because 
the securities are directly held and the owners of the securities have a 
direct relationship with the issuer. 
CBCA Part VII (and the old UCC Article 8 provisions upon which 
it was based) facilitated the direct holding system, as has been discussed, 
by providing a detailed set of rules regarding the transfer and negotia-
bility of securities under such a system. Since the CBCA only addresses 
direct holdings, an underlying and unstated assumption is that the direct 
holding system is the method by which most securities transactions 
occur. However, this is not the case. 
Presently, the dominant method for the holding of the vast volume 
of securities that are traded on the Canadian market is by the indirect 
holding system. In the indirect holding system, an investor's proprietary 
interest in a security is recorded on the books of an intermediary. The 
intermediary is usually a licensed security broker, bank, or custodian. 
In tum, this intermediary may have its interests recorded on the books 
of another intermediary up the chain. This chain of intermediaries can 
continue upwards and ultimately ends in either one of two possibilities: 
either that the last intermediary (a) actually has physical possession the 
security certificates, or (b) is recorded by the issuer as being the regis-
tered holder of the security. Typically, this last intermediary at the top 
of the chain is a central securities depository.45 
In Canada, the primary central securities depository is the Canadian 
Depository for Securities Limited ("CDS")46 while in the U.S., it is the 
Depository Trust Company ("DTC").47 
The indirect holding system is considered much more efficient than 
the direct holding system. The actual physical delivery of certificates 
45 For an excellent overview of the foregoing, see Eric T. Spink & Maxime A. Pare, '1'he 
Uniform Securities Transfer Act: Globalized Commercial Law For Canada" (2004) 19 
B.F.L.R. 321at324-331. 
46 See CDS online: <www.cds.ca>. 
41 See OTC online: <www.dtc.org>. 
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contemplated by the direct holding system can be extremely costly given 
the large volume of trading that occurs in the marketplace. In contrast, 
the indirect holding system is much more efficient in that it does not 
rely on the physical delivery of certificates but, instead, relies on a book 
entry settlement system. The present reality is that most publicly traded 
securities are registered in the name of CDS & Co., which is the nominee 
for CDS. 48 The result is that CDS is often the "last intermediary" holding 
the vast majority of publicly traded securities. The benefit of this practice 
is that transactions among lower tiered intermediaries can be accom-
plished by mere book entries to their CDS accounts as opposed to the 
tedious delivery of physical share certificates. 
The indirect holding system's superior efficiency is evident by the 
number and value of trades generated. CDS presently holds over $27 
trillion on deposit and handles over 77 million securities trades an-
nually. 49 The use of CDS seems to also be on rise. In 2004, CDS handled 
an average of 166,600 exchange trades per day. However, in 2005 the 
average was 218,000 trades per day representing a remarkable 31 per 
cent increase over 2004.so Clearly, a quick glance at the these CDS 
figures indicates the dominance of the indirect holding system in Canada. 
Similarly, large numbers exist for the U.S. and indicate the wide-
spread prevalence of the indirect holding system there.' 1 The U.S. did 
respond to the rise of the indirect holding system. In 1994, the ALI and 
NCCUSL approved a revised version of UCC Article 8 ("Rev. UCC Art. 
8"), which provided a legal basis and infrastructure for the practice of 
indirect holding as well as made some minor adjustments to the direct 
holding system. In tum, these revisions were all accepted by most of the 
states and adopted. Rev. UCC Art. 8 was the product of extensive work 
over a five-year period including consultations with knowledgeable in-
terest groups.'2 
48 Spink, supra, n. 45. 
49 CDS, supra. n. 46. 
"' See CDS Annual Report 2005 at 4, available at CDS website, supra, n. 46. In addition, on 
6 October 2005 there was a record breaking 387,360 exchange trades processed. 
51 See DTCC Annual Report 2004 online: <http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/2004annuaV 
DTCC-2004-AnnuaLReport.pdf>. In the U.S., the DTS is owned by the Depository 
Trust and Clearing Corporation (the "DTCC"). In 2004, the DTCC settled transactions 
valued at over $1. l quadrillion, which is equivalent to approximately $4.5 trillion worth of 
transactions each day. 
52 See J. S Rogers, "Policy perspectives on revised U.C.C. Article 8" (1996) 43 UCLA L. 
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Despite the fact the indirect holding system is dominant in Canada 
as well as in its major trading partner, the U.S., there are currently no 
federal Canadian statutory provisions that directly address, support, or 
legitimate this practice. Ontario did attempt a partial solution in its 
OBCA provisions analogous to CBCA Part VIL In 1986, Ontario tried 
to reconcile the indirect holding system within its own OBCA statutory 
provisions by creating the concept of "constructive delivery". In essence, 
s. 85 of the OBCA states that once the appropriate entry has been made 
in the records of the applicable clearing agency,s3 such a book entry 
transfer is deemed to have the same effect as the actual physical delivery 
of the share certificate. s4 For all practical purposes, "applicable clearing 
agency" means the CDS. However, this solution is incomplete since it 
only contemplates those intermediaries who are directly listed as holders 
within the books of CDS. It does not address the many other interme-
diaries and investors that exist below this top-tier of intermediaries. 
Ontario has recently enacted legislation, the Securities Transfer 
Ads ("STA"), in light of the inadequacies of s. 85 of the OBCA in 
handling the concept of indirect holding. The implications of the Ontario 
Rev. 1435 for an excellent overview of the process that took place in the U.S. Rogers notes 
that meetings were arranged with individual securities firms, banks, transfer agents, lenders, 
as well as with large industry organizations. Moreover, representatives of the Securities 
Exchange Commission, the Department of Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, and many other important government institutions attended each drafting 
session. 
" OBCA, supra, n. 35, s. 85( 1 ). This section states: 
If a security shown in the records of a clearing agency is evidenced by, 
(a) a security certificate in the custody of the clearing agency or a custodian or of a 
nominee of either, subject to the instructions of the clearing agency, and is in bearer 
form or endorsed in blank by an appropriate person or registered in the name of the 
clearing agency or a custodian or of a nominee of either; or 
(b) an uncertificated security registered or recorded in records maintained by oron behalf 
of the issuer in the name of the clearing agency or a custodian or of a nominee of either, 
subject to the instructions of the clearing agency, 
then, in addition to other methods, a transfer or pledge of the security or any interest 
therein may be effected by the making of an appropriate entry in the records of the 
clearing agency. 
" OBCA, ibid., s. 85(3) states: "A transfer or pledge under this section has the effect of a 
delivery of a security in bearer form or duly endorsed in blank representing the amount of 
the obligation or the number of shares or rights transferred or pledged." 
"Securities Transfer Act, S.O. 2006, c. 8 [Ontario STA]. As of the time of the writing of this 
article, this legislation has been passed in Ontario though it is not yet in force. The new 
legislation will be discussed in the next part of this article. 
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ST A, which has been enacted though not yet in force, will be discussed 
in the next part of this article. 
The present situation is somewhat ironic, given the original under-
lying rationales for the current version of CBCA Part VII - to establish 
a statutory regime that reflected efficient market practices, harmonize 
with the major financial jurisdictions, and move towards a more unified 
set of rules for corporate securities. In fairness, at the time the current 
CBCA Part VII provisions were enacted, these rationales could have 
been fairly said to have been reasonably fulfilled given the circumstances 
of the time. However, in the three decades that have passed since CBCA 
Part VII was enacted, the market practices in Canada and in other major 
jurisdictions such as the U.S. have moved on. 
The result is that the original underlying rationales have become 
disconnected with the present commercial realities. Given the fact that 
the CBCA Part VII provisions do not address the dominant indirect 
holding system in Canada, they neither reflect current commercial prac-
tices in Canada nor harmonize with the major financial jurisdiction of 
the U.S. Lastly, rather than move towards a more unified set of rules for 
corporate securities, the present CBCA Part VII provisions run the haz-
ard of either unnecessarily duplicating or interacting in an uncertain way 
with remedial provincial legislation aimed at addressing indirect hold-
ing. 
The current situation is strangely reminiscent of Canadian federal 
corporate law prior to the amendments of the mid-1970s. During that 
time period, the legislation awaited amendments to bring it in line with 
market practices of negotiability. Similarly, the present CBCA awaits a 
response to the modem commercial realities of indirect holding. 
(c) Current Developments with Provincial Corporate Statutes 
The Ontario STA was recently passed by the Ontario legislature 
(May 2006) though it is not yet in force and awaits proclamation by 
Lieutenant Governor of Ontario. Similarly, Alberta has passed its own 
Securities Transfer ActS6 and, it too, is not yet in force. Both the Ontario 
STA and Alberta STA have virtually identical provisions. Ontario and 
Alberta have delayed bringing their respective statutes into force (for 
56 Securities Transfer Act, S.A. 2006, c. S-4.S [Alberta STA]. 
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about six to eight months) in the hopes of allowing other provinces the 
opportunity to harmonize their legislation with the Ontario I Alberta 
versions. 
Both the Ontario and Alberta statutes were heavily influenced by 
the model "Uniform Securities Transfer Act" ("USTA") prepared by the 
Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA).57 The CSA is a non-legis-
lative forum without the formal authority to enact any laws that allows 
the thirteen provincial and territorial securities regulators to coordinate 
and harmonize Canada's capital markets regulation. Similar to the ALI 
and NCCUSL, the CSA is a very influential organization that consults 
regularly with relevant government and industry bodies regarding rele-
vant issues. The analogy between the CSA and the ALI and NCCUSL 
is somewhat appropriate given how the USTA was very strongly based 
on the provisions of Rev. UCC Art. 8 (which itself was drafted by the 
ALI and NCCUSL). The fact that the USTA drew so heavily on Rev. 
UCC Art. 8 is not inconsistent with prior Canadian experiences given 
that the mid- l 970s amendments to the CBCA were also drawn from the 
UCC. In the final result, both the Ontario and Alberta statutes have 
incorporated substantially all of the recommendations of the UST A. 
A more detailed discussion of the policy rationales and thinking 
behind the UST A can be found in the USTA Consultation paper entitled 
"Proposal for a Modernized Uniform Law in Canada Governing the 
Holding, Transfer and Pledging of Securities" ("UST A Consultation 
Paper").58 The USTA is intended to modernize the law of securities 
transfer in Canada. 
In attempting to modernize the law of securities transfer in Canada, 
the UST A proposes changes not only to corporate statutes but also to a 
variety of other statutes including statutes dealing with personal property 
security interests. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in any 
detail those changes but it should be noted that such changes are intended 
to bring greater certainty in the manner in which a security interest is 
57 Approved at the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Annual Meeting on 22-26 August 
2004. A copy of the UST A may be obtained online: Ontario Securities Commission <http:/ 
/www .osc.gov .on.ca/MarketRegulation/SpecialProjects/usta/ustll-20041112-task-
force.pdf >. 
'" A copy of the UST A Consultation Paper can be found online: Ontario Securities Commis-
sion <http://www.osc.gov .on.ca/MarketRegulation/SpecialProjects/usta/ustll-20040528_ 
consultation-paper.pdf >. 
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granted in corporate shares or related securities (i.e., pledging corporate 
shares as collateral). 
In tenns of methodology, the UST A Consultation Paper proposes 
to remove the direct holding provisions from provincial corporate stat-
utes and place them, with slight modifications, within the USTA. With 
respect to indirect holding, a new set of provisions will be implemented. 
Both the direct and indirect holding provisions in the USTA are sub-
stantially founded upon Rev. UCC Art. 8. 
(i) Direct holding system 
The basic tenets of the direct holding system are not substantially 
changed by the USTA. For example, the provisions in Part VI of the 
OBCA (which is analogous to Part VIl of the CBCA) regarding the 
direct holding system are to be deleted and will be re-enacted in a 
functionally similar fashion in the Ontario STA.s9 Not all provisions of 
OBCA Part VI will be deleted. The administrative provisions dealing 
with securities registers, issuance of certificates, and transmission of 
securities will all remain in the OBCA as these are regarded as squarely 
within the domain of corporate law. 
There will be one substantive change to the direct holding provi-
sions. The UST A replaces the concept of a bona fide purchaser (or good 
faith purchaser) with the concept of a "protected purchaser". Similar to 
the older concept of a "good faith purchaser", the protected purchaser, 
"in addition to acquiring the rights of a purchaser, also acquires the 
purchaser's interest in the security free of any adverse claim."6() The 
important difference with the new concept of the "protected purchaser" 
is that the protected purchaser does not need to demonstrate good faith 
in order to take advantage of the protections offered under the ST A. 
In addition, an entitlement holder may not bring a legal action 
against any purchaser of a financial asset where the purchaser has given 
value, taken possession or control of the security, and does not act in 
collusion with the securities intermediary in violating the securities 
intermediary's obligations.61 The term "in collusion" is defined to mean 
59 These direct holding provisions can be found in ss. 29-32 (endorsements, instructions, and 
entitlement orders), ss. 33-40 (warranties applicable to direct holdings), and interspersed 
through Parts III, IV, and V of the Ontario STA, supra, n. SS. 
60 Ontario ST A, ibid., s. 70. 
61 Ibid., s. 97(7). 
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"in concert, by conspiratorial arrangement or by agreement for the pur-
pose of violating a person's right in respect of a financial asset."62 
The apparent net effect of such changes appears to be to provide 
greater protection to a transferee of securities. The requirement that an 
entitlement holder prove that the purchaser actively acted in collusion 
to deprive the entitlement holder of its rights is arguably a much higher 
evidentiary hurdle to surpass than the previous benchmarks of lack of 
"good faith" orof "actual notice". Presumably the intent of such a change 
is to enhance the free flow of securities by providing an even higher 
level of protection to a transferee of securities. 
(ii) Indirect holding system 
The UST A provisions relating to indirect holding systems represent 
a significant change to Canadian legislative approaches for the transfer 
of securities. However, this is not alarming given that the indirect holding 
system is widespread in practice in both Canada and the U.S. 
The fundamental concept underpinning the indirect holding system 
under the UST A is the idea of a "security entitlement". The UST A rejects 
the idea that a beneficial owner of a book-based security has any direct 
rights against the issuer. After all, the issuer may have no knowledge 
whatsoever of the alleged beneficial owner's entitlement, which, in an 
indirect holding system, is a book entry in the records of a security 
intermediary. Instead, the UST A provides that the beneficial owner of 
a book-based security has a bundle of rights that may only be exercised 
against the securities intermediary that holds the underlying securities 
or assets. 
As Professor Geva succinctly explains: 
[l]n the indirect holding system, an investor does not hold a security, does not 
have a property right in a specific security, and is not in a direct legal relationship 
with the security issuer. Rather, an investor in the indirect holding system is the 
holder of a securities entitlement, credited to a securities account kept with a 
securities intermediary. A security entitlement consists of a bundle of rights 
against the securities intermediary backed by financial assets held by the inter-
mediary. Financial assets held by the intermediary may either actual securities or 
security entitlements backed by actual securities held by an upper-tier interme-
diary. Generally speaking, the entitlement holder has a proprietary right in a pool 
62 Ibid., s. I (I). 
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of financial assets, but not in any one particular asset among those of which the 
pool consists.63 
Under the Ontario ST A, a security entitlement generally arises 
when a securities intermediary credits a financial asset to a person's 
security account, receives a financial asset from a person, or is obligated 
by law to credit a financial asset to a person.64 The term "financial asset" 
has been broadly defined to include not only a security or share but also 
any type of obligation that is dealt in or traded in on markets or recog-
nized as a medium for investment.6s Such a broad, neutral drafting 
approach ensures that the subject matter for what constitutes a financial 
asset is not closed due to lack of legislative foresight and can be properly 
reflected by the actual market. The Ontario STA then sets forth a regime 
whereby an entitlement holder's rights may on be asserted by the enti-
tlement holder against its own security intermediary.66 
Interestingly, "security transfers" under the USTA provisions (or 
under the Ontario ST A or Alberta ST A) are not really transfers at all. In 
a common trade, security entitlements are created not through transfers 
per se, but by the creation of a book entry by a security intermediary 
(for the "transferee") and the corresponding extinguishing of a security 
entitlement on the books of another intermediary (for the "transferor"). 
The key advantage of this is that it jettisons the old and inefficient idea 
of physically delivering certificates and replaces it with a legislative 
scheme that more accurately reflects the system of debits and credits 
that occurs on the books of securities intermediaries on a day-to-day 
basis.67 
Although the entitlement holder does not have a direct property 
interest in the underlying securities or a direct right of action against the 
issuer, the USTA provides that the entitlement holder will generally 
have functionally the same rights (e.g., interest, dividend, and voting 
rights) as a direct holder. This is accomplished by the entitlement holder 
63 Geva, supra, n. 44 at 394. 
64 Ontario STA, supra, n. 55, s. 95(1). 
"'Ibid., s. 1(1). 
66 Generally, see Part VI of the Ontario ST A which sets forth detailed provisions. 
67 For an excellent and schematically illustrated description of this process, see Spink, supra, 
n. 45 at 362, where the author explains a hypothetical transaction that spans Canada and 
the U.S. In essence, the only real transfer that occurs is at the top tier, typically between 
CDS and OTC. 
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giving directions to the securities intennediary pursuant to the legisla-
tion.68 
As a final note, the Ontario ST A is substantially default /enabling 
legislation and the parties may contract out of most of its provisions.69 
However, given the prevalence of the indirect holding system, the ability 
to contract out is not likely to be invoked for publicly traded securities. 
(d) Critical Analysis of the Role ofCBCA Part VII in Light of 
Present Circumstances 
The analysis of CBCA Part VII is conducted, in the context of the 
foregoing discussion, from both the perspective of (a) the policy ration-
ales of the CBCA, as well as (b) the impact of provincial ST As. Finally, 
this analysis reflects upon the appropriate role of CBCA Part VII in the 
future. 
(i) Context of CBCA policy rationales 
Good corporate law is based upon sound policy goals. These policy 
goals, generally speaking, are:70 
• enhancing economic efficiency; 
• ensuring accountability of corporate managers, directors, 
and officers; 
• protecting shareholders and other vulnerable parties; 
• attracting business to the jurisdiction by inspiring confi-
dence, supporting competitiveness, innovation, and growth; 
and 
• responding effectively to the needs of larger widely held and 
smaller closely held businesses. 
An evaluation of CBCA Part VII against these general policy goals 
yields slightly different results if one views these provisions as operating 
68 See, e.g., Ontario STA, supra, n. 55, s. 100. 
69 Ibid., s. 5. However, note thats. 5(2) contains some exceptions and specifically states: "The 
obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care imposed by this Act may not 
be disclaimed by agreement, but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by 
which the performance of such obligations is to be measured so long as such standards are 
not manifestly unreasonable." 
7° For a detailed discussion, see Poonam Puri, "The Hallmarks of Good Corporate Law: A 
Performance Evaluation of the Canada Business Corporations Act," prepared for Corpo-
rations Canada, Industry Canada, 2004. 
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at two distinct levels as previously mentioned. The administrative pro-
visions provide the fundamental documentary requirements and infra-
structure. Although not nearly as powerful as the oppression remedy 
provisions, such basic provisions serve to protect shareholders by laying 
down a basic administrative structure that can later provide the eviden-
tiary foundation for the exercise of shareholder rights. 
In contrast, the current CBCA Part VII provisions relating direct 
holding I negotiability of corporate securities do not seem to directly 
further any of the above-stated policy goals of corporate law. The place-
ment of negotiability provisions within the CBCA could be viewed as 
somewhat out of place when considered in the context of corporate law. 
Corporate law is generally concerned with the internal governance of 
the corporation and is primarily focused on the responsibilities, duties, 
and liabilities of directors and managers, and the rights of shareholders.71 
The negotiability provisions do not seem to squarely address any of 
those concerns. 
When viewed in historical context, one could persuasively argue 
that the present CBCA Part VII provisions did fulfill the corporate policy 
goal of economic efficiency back in the mid-1970s. The CBCA Part VII 
provisions filled a legal vacuum relating to the negotiability of corporate 
securities when the law did not keep up with market practice. By filling 
this legal vacuum with a comprehensive code modeled on the UCC, the 
CBCA Part VII provisions brought a significant increased degree of 
legal certainty, at least with regard to the direct holding of corporate 
securities, thereby making a contribution to economic efficiency. 
In short, one could view the direct holding provisions of CBCA 
Part VII as an "awkward but necessary for the time" type of provision 
in the absence of any better solution. However, as noted above, times 
have changed since the mid-1970s. The rise of the indirect holding 
system, along with the corresponding changes to UCC Article 8 simply 
cannot be ignored. In addition, the rise of provincial securities transfer 
legislation, based upon the more modem Rev. UCC Art. 8, provides a 
71 See Poonam Puri, "A Rational Allocation of Responsibility between Corporate and Secu-
rities Laws in Canada," prepared for Corporations Canada, Industry Canada, 2004, where 
it is noted that corporate statutes do contain a limited number of provisions that protect the 
rights of creditors and other stakeholders. For example, s. 42 of the CBCA protects share-
holders in the context of directors declaring dividends. Similarly, s. 119 of the CBCA 
imposes personal liability on directors for employees' unpaid wages. 
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potentially more economically efficient alternative to dealing with both 
direct and indirect holding that was not available during the mid-1970s. 
(ii) Impact of provincial securities transfer legislation 
In assessing the impact of provincial securities transfer legislation 
with respect to CBCA Part VII, it is useful to gauge the UST A policy 
objectives against those of the CBCA. The UST A has a number of stated 
policy objectives which include the following: 72 
• providing a sound legal system for existing securities holding 
and transfer practices, particularly the indirect holding sys-
tem; 
• harmonizing with Rev. UCC Art. 8; 
• achieving uniformity within Canada by making the UST A a 
separate statute; and 
• controlling systemic risk, achieving finality of settlement, 
and avoiding legal risk. 
On a first cursory reading it does not appear that any of these policy 
objectives directly conflict with the CBCA. Indeed, some of them are 
complementary. Harmonizing with the American UCC can hardly be in 
conflict with the CBCA given the present CBCA provisions themselves 
were modeled on the prior UCC rules. Although Rev. UCC Art. 8 has 
had its modest share of criticism, 73 the UST A Consultation Paper makes 
it clear that it considers Rev. UCC Art. 8 as generally recognized as the 
world's most advanced securities transfer legislation. 74 Furthermore, the 
USTA explicitly recognizes the fact that the U.S. and Canadian securities 
markets are becoming increasingly more integrated with the attendant 
result that harmonization is more desirable than ever.75 
72 USTA Consultation Paper, supra, n. 58 at 22-27. 
71 For example, see F. J Facciolo, "Father knows best: revised Article 8 and the individual 
investor'' (Spring 2000) 27 Fla. St. U .L. Rev. 615, where the author criticizes revised UCC 
article 8 as having ignored the interests of the consumer investor and privileging the interests 
of upper tier securities intermediaries. One key criticism is that the consumer investor no 
longer has any direct right against the issuer but only an unsecured right against the 
intermediary. For a direct reply to such criticism, see C. W. J Mooney Jr., "The Roles of 
Individuals in UCC Reform: Is the Uniform Law Process a Potted Plant? The Case of 
Revised UCC Article 8" (Summer 2002) 27 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 553. 
74 USTA Consultation Paper, supra, n. 58. 
75 Ibid. 
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Although the current CBCA Part VII provisions were modeled on 
the prior UCC, there has been some criticism for not following the UCC 
more closely. It has been remarked that there are significant differences 
in wording between CBCA Part VII and the UCC provisions upon which 
it was modeled. "It is often unclear whether these changes in wording 
were intended to make some substantive alteration to the American rule 
or were motivated primarily by the idiosyncratic preferences of the 
Canadian draftsperson."76 On the other hand, the present USTA Con-
sultation Paper makes it clear that the UST A seeks to avoid this form of 
confusion by relying and borrowing heavily on the wording from Rev. 
UCCArt. 8. 
It is also worth noting that Rev. UCC Art. 8 also comes with an 
extensive set of official commentary (prepared by the NCCUSL and 
ALI) on each of its provisions. In the U.S., these commentaries are 
intended to act as an interpretive aid for the provisions of the UCC as 
enacted by each state. Although there is no firm Canadian tradition of 
the judiciary relying upon such commentaries, the authors of the UST A 
make reference to a few Canadian decisions that referred to the official 
comments of the UCC in interpreting Canadian legislation.77 To that 
end, the USTA itself comes with its own commentary .78 It is interesting 
to note that the USTA commentary, as might be expected, is substantially 
similar to the official commentary to Rev. UCC Art. 8. The similarity is 
to such an extent that the cover page notes that some of the commentary 
is quoted directly from the official commentary of Rev. UCC Art. 8 with 
the legal permission of ALI and NCCUSL. 
Thus, the harmonization of the UST A with the American UCC is 
consistent with the prior history of the CBCA. In fact, the USTA goes 
further by borrowing more heavily from the wording of the UCC as well 
as implementing its own commentary, which in turn also borrows heav-
ily from the UCC Official Comments. 
The USTA goals of controlling systemic risk, achieving finality of 
settlement, and controlling legal risk are also consistent with the CBCA 
76 McGuiness, supra, n. 5 at 587. 
77 UST A Consultation Paper, supra, n. 58, at 35. 
78 See UTSA with detailed comments (approved by the ULCC) and available online: Ontario 
Securities Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/MarketRegulation/SpecialProjects/ 
usta/usta...20041112.....task-force.pdf>. 
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rationale of achieving economic efficiency. All of the goals can fairly 
be said to be sub-variants of economic efficiency. 
However, two of the goals of the USTA have the potential of being 
problematic in light of CBCA Part VII. At first glance, the UST A goals 
of providing a legal infrastructure for existing securities practices and 
for achieving unity in Canada could seem consistent with CBCA Part 
VII policy rationales. Arguably, they are consistent but lack of coordi-
nation between the CBCA and provincial ST As could be potentially 
problematic. 
With respect to indirect holdings, there is no immediate problem 
since the CBCA does not address that matter. In this case, provincial 
legislation such as the Ontario ST A and Alberta ST A serves the useful 
function of filling a void in the legislation. However, if the CBCA is 
later amended to address indirect holdings, there is the potential for a 
confusing and duplicative array of legislation. 
Even more immediate is the issue of direct holding. The Ontario 
ST A applies to both direct and indirect holdings of securities. The On-
tario STA states that if the issuer is incorporated under federal law, then 
the validity of the security is determined by the laws of Canada.79 How-
ever, for matters such as registration of transfer, whether an adverse 
claim may be asserted against a person, and other transfer issues, the 
Ontario ST A states that the law that applies is the law of the issuer's 
jurisdiction. 80 In turn, it is stated that, in the case of an issuer incorporated 
under the law of Canada, the law of the issuer's jurisdiction is the 
province or territory in which the issuer has its registered head office.81 
Let us assume that a federally incorporated business corporation 
has its registered head office in Ontario. According to the Ontario STA, 
the governing law for the validity of the security is the CBCA, but the 
governing law for the transfer of the security would be that of Ontario 
(where the head office is located). However, the CBCA has its own 
transfer provisions for direct holdings. If it were a direct holding in 
question, then there would be potentially two different sets of rules to 
apply - the Ontario ST A and the CBCA Part VII provisions. 
1
• Ontario ST A, supra, n. 55, s. 44( I). 
80 Ibid., s. 44(2). 
•• Ibid., s. 44(5). Note that for Crown corporations, the governing law is that specified by the 
issuer. 
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This whole issue could be moot if both the Ontario STA and CBCA 
Part VII provisions were identical. However, as noted earlier in this 
article, the Ontario STA makes use of the new term "protected pur-
chaser" while the CBCA Part VII provisions make use of the older 
concept of good faith or bona fide purchaser. This can be potentially 
problematic since the new term "protected purchaser" ostensibly pro-
vides more protection to the transferee. In contrast to this, as Part 2 of 
this article explored, the Javelin case82 was decided under the CBCA 
and made specific reference to the concept of a bona fide purchaser. The 
statutory provisions of the Ontario STA could potentially come into 
conflict with CBCA Part VII and the decided case law. 
It is arguable that the likelihood that such a conflict would actually 
arise is quite remote (given the relatively low incidence of reported case 
law and the less frequent use of the direct holding system in comparison 
to the indirect holding system). One might also argue that, in fact, most 
cases could possibly have the same result regardless of whether one uses 
the protected purchaser standard or bona fide purchaser standard. Nev-
ertheless, such uncertainty should be clearly addressed since it goes 
against the efficiency policy goals of both the UST A and CBCA. There 
must be a rational allocation of responsibility between the CBCA and 
USTA and this is the issue that is considered next. 
(iii) Future role of CBCA Part VII provisions 
An attempt to gauge the future role of the CBCA Part VII provisions 
can be taken from a variety of different perspectives. One tempting route 
would be to analyze the issue from a constitutional perspective and 
allocate the responsibility for corporate security transfers along lines of 
constitutional jurisdiction. This article takes no position on the consti-
tutional question. 83 It assumes, for the purposes of its analysis only, that 
both provincial and federal governments may competently legislate in 
82 Supra, n. 27. 
83 At least one scholar has addressed this question directly and come to the conclusion that 
most security transfer matters are within the constitutional jurisdiction of the provinces 
with the exception of corporate securities that are bills or notes. Even with regard to such 
corporate securities, this respected scholar advocates that the federal government should 
voluntarily vacate the field for provincial legislation in the interests of greater efficiency 
and harmony. Thus, even a constitutional analysis may ultimately have to importefficiency-
based conciliations. See Geva, supra, n. 44. 
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this area and then goes further in an attempt to discern which jurisdiction 
may legislate in the most efficient manner. 
Previous discussions of the role of the UST A in relation to corporate 
statutes have tended to focus on a categorical analysis of the subject 
matter. The classic argument is that security transfer rules are not prop-
erly categorized as corporate law since they do not relate to fundamental 
corporate matters such as governance or protection of shareholder rights. 
The USTA Consultation Paper argues that "[t]he settlement of a typical 
market trade in corporate stock has almost nothing to do with corporate 
law. It is fundamentally a matter of property law. "84 
While a categorical analysis has the allure of providing a definitive 
characterization of the issue with attendant consequences, it may not be 
quite so easy to pigeon-hole the issues. Corporate law can be regarded 
as an amalgam of various different categories of law. For instance, 
contract law can come into play as some have viewed the corporation 
as a nexus of contracts with the articles of incorporation sometimes 
being conceived metaphorically as a contract between ownership and 
management. Tort-like concepts are also found in corporate statutes such 
as the duty of care and fiduciary duties owed by directors to the corpo-
ration. 8~ Arguably, fundamental corporate matters such as enabling pro-
visions relating to pre-emptive rights116 and options87 relate to property 
rights. Rights attaching to shares are considered to be a fundamental 
corporate law concept yet one of those rights usually includes the right 
to receiving the remaining property of the corporation on dissolution88 
and may thus be conceived as also integrating property rights into the 
concept. 
Taken to an extreme, a radical deconstruction of corporate law 
could potentially yield nothing but a handful of contract, tort, and prop-
erty law concepts. While a categorical approach can yield some inter-
esting observations, the critical juncture in the analysis would be where 
to exactly draw the line between corporate law and property law where 
84 USTA Consultation Paper, supra, n. 58 at 41. It also notes that, in the U.S., transfer rules 
have always been considered a matter of commercial property-transfer law. 
•s Section 122 of the CBCA mandates such duties and even goes so far as to say that such 
duties cannot be contracted out of by the directors: CBCA, supra, n. I. 
"" Ibid., s. 28. 
•
1 Ibid., s. 29. 
88 Ibid., s. 24(3)(c). 
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aspects of both may appear to be significantly present. Where the line 
begins to become fuzzy, it is submitted that an efficiency analysis may 
assist in providing guidance. 
With respect to the CBCA Part VII provisions, several efficiency 
matters may be considered: 
• Nature of the indirect holding system: as outlined in Rev. UCC 
Art. 8, the fundamental concept of the indirect holding system is 
the security entitlement. In turn, an entitlement holder may only 
generally assert its rights against its own security intermediary. 
Clearly then, a great deal of risk and focus has been shifted 
towards the use of a security intermediary. There are a number 
of ways of mitigating against the risk of using a securities inter-
mediary. For example, the Canadian Investor Protection Fund89 
("CIPF') provides insurance (of up to $1 million) against in-
vestment dealer bankruptcy for customers of its member invest-
ment dealers. As the CIPF notes, investment dealer bankruptcy 
is a relatively rare occurrence90 in part due to the regulatory 
requirements imposed by provincial securities commissions. 
The fact that many securities intermediaries (i.e., broker and 
dealers) are regulated closely by the provincial securities admin-
istrators is highly significant. Since the indirect holding provi-
sions direct the entitlement holder exclusively to the securities 
intermediary with respect to its security entitlement rights, the 
manner in which such securities intermediaries are regulated will 
be of great interest to the entitlement holder. Despite the fact that 
security intermediary regulation is not technically one of the 
goals of securities transfer legislation, the interaction between to 
two subjects is so great under the indirect holding regime that it 
would be more efficient to have the two matters handled at the 
same level of government. 
A general principle of economic efficiency is that, all other things 
being the same, responsibility should be delegated to lowest cost 
monitor. In this case, it would be redundant and cost inefficient 
19 See the Canadian Investor Protection Fund, online: <http://www.cipf.ca/C-..home.htm>. 
90 Ibid. The CIPF notes that, since its inception in 1969, a total of$3S million has been paid 
out to eligible customers of seventeen insolvent members. 
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to have the federal government monitor the actions of securities 
intermediaries when the same function is already being carried 
out by provincial security regulators. While it is theoretically 
possible to have the federal government legislate the indirect 
holding system and leave the monitoring to the provincial se-
curities commissions, this too would be inefficient since there 
would be attendant information cost associated with the federal 
and provincial governments coordinating with each other. 
The more efficient solution would be to have the indirect holding 
system governed by the entity that already governs the regulation 
of security intermediaries. Currently, that would be the provincial 
governments. 
• Direct and indirect holding system should be together: Re-
gardless of which jurisdiction governs the indirect holding sys-
tem, both systems should be governed at the same level of gov-
ernment. Having two separate systems governed by different 
levels of government would unnecessarily confuse matters by 
requiring inquiry into two different statutes enacted by two dif-
ferent levels of government. If the direct and indirect holding 
systems are consolidated into a single code, the result is a higher 
degree of clarity and certainty. 
• Securities consist of more than just corporate securities. If 
the CBCA Part VII provisions were amended to reflect the direct 
and indirect holding provisions of Rev. UCC Art. 8, there would 
still be problems and a gap to fill. Presumably, such purported 
CBCA amendments would only apply to corporate securities 
since the CBCA could only deal with federal corporate matters. 
It would not apply to provincial corporate securities. It would 
almost certainly not apply to securities issued by non-corporate 
entities such as limited partnerships and trusts. One need only 
look to the Ontario Securities Act91 definition of "security" to 
appreciate that the types of security traded on the market encom-
passes far more than just corporate shares or securities. 
Therefore, even if the CBCA enacted provisions akin to Rev. 
UCC Art. 8, it would still be necessary for the provinces or federal 
•• Supra, n. 10. 
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government to enact similar legislation to cover all securities 
(i.e., not just federally incorporated corporate securities). This 
would lead to an unnecessary and inefficient duplication of leg-
islation. This would also generate additional information costs 
since it would be necessary to coordinate both federal and pro-
vincial legislation so that federal corporate securities would be 
treated in a similar manner as all other securities in the market-
place. If federal corporate securities were to be treated in a dif-
ferent manner than other securities, this could lead to uncertainty 
and confusion as well as possible exploitation of differences in 
the legislation. In light of this potential problem, the more cost-
effective solution would be to have the provincial legislatures 
address the issue entirely since they necessarily have to address 
the issues in any event at this time. 
• Personal Property Security Laws: The USTA, Ontario STA, 
and Alberta STA. in addition to addressing the transfer of secu-
rities, have provisions regarding the pledging of securities as 
collateral. These provisions are intended to give greater certainty 
to lenders when securities are pledged as collateral for an obli-
gation. In tum, it is intended that such enhanced legal certainty 
will promote the jurisdiction's competitiveness in the market and 
attract capital. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to detail the exact 
mechanism by which such changes are accomplished, 92 it is im-
portant to note that personal property security laws have always 
been the subject of provincial legislation.93 Therefore, the 
changes required to allow personal property security law to more 
effectively deal with book-based securities (i.e., in the indirect 
02 One of the key problems was that it was unclear how one could obtain an enforceable 
security interest in book-based securities. Lenders would often have to insist on a registra-
tion under the relevant personal property security statute and perhaps even require the 
delivery of physical certificates. Such extended procedures would often be costly and 
tedious. The UST A, Ontario ST A, and Alberta ST A handle this problem by creating the 
concept of "control". "Control" is considered to be the functional equivalent of possession. 
When a secured party has control over a security, its interest will take priority over other 
parties that do not have control. Unlike the older and more narrow concept of''possession'', 
the new concept of control is not limited to physical possession and can apply to book 
based securities more easily. 
93 For example, Ontario has the Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10 [Ontario 
PPSA]. 
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holding system) will have to be implemented at the provincial 
level. 
For example, in the case of the Ontario ST A there are changes 
not only to OBCA transfer provisions (most of which have been 
removed and placed wholly within the Ontario ST A) but there 
are also significant changes enacted to the Ontario PPSA (which 
now allow for the aforementioned provisions relating to book-
based securities). There is greater integration between both the 
Ontario STA and Ontario PPSA. Functionally this makes sense 
because the transfer of securities (governed by Ontario STA) and 
the pledging of securities as collateral (governed by Ontario 
PPSA) are two very common occurrences that can often appear 
in the same transaction. Having both transfers and pledges inte-
grated in a legislative sense by the same level of government is 
efficient. 
On the other hand, if corporate securities transfers were governed 
by the CBCA, then it would be necessary to review how such 
transfer legislation would be integrated with provincial personal 
property legislation. The additional information costs incurred 
would then be multiplied since the federal legislation would have 
to coordinate with not just one, but all of the provinces' personal 
property legislation. Again, given the added information costs 
and time consuming process off ederal I provincial coordination, 
it seems the more efficient solution is to allow the provinces to 
handle the issue of security transfers entirely since they would 
already have to coordinate it with their personal property legis-
lation in any event. 
• Harmonization with UCC model: If the goal is to harmonize 
Canadian legislation with the UCC model, then in addition to 
closely following substantive provisions (as the USTA has al-
ready done in both its proposed statute as well as its commen-
tary), it would be wise to follow the general overall scheme as 
well. In the UCC model, Rev. UCC Art. 8 is adopted by each 
state as a separate piece of legislation, rather than integrating it 
into a state corporate statute. In the mid-1970s, the direct holding 
I negotiability concepts of the UCC model of the time were 
integrated directly into the CBCA, presumably because, in part, 
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there was no separate provincial statute within which to place 
such provisions. 
As has been noted before in this article, the CBCA amendments 
of the mid-1970s were probably the best and most pragmatic 
solution available at the time in light of those circumstances. 
However, they did have the consequence of significantly de-
parting from the UCC model that they were trying to follow. 
While the UCC model contemplated a separate self-contained 
piece oflegislation at the state (i.e., provincial) level, the amend-
ments of the mid 1970s embedded the provisions within an ex-
isting corporate statute at the federal, rather than provincial, level. 
In retrospect, the hazards of importing UCC Art. 8 provisions 
without also implementing such provisions in the same general 
overall schema become starkly apparent. Since CBCA Part VII 
was enacted at the federal level, coordinating with all provincial 
legislatures on closely related matters such as regulation of se-
curities intermediaries and personal property security law would 
become necessary sooner or later. Similarly, since CBCA Part 
VII can only deal with corporate securities, there will necessarily 
be a large void relating to all other types of securities that would 
likely have to be filled by the provinces, thus requiring further 
coordination between both levels of government. 
As a final passing note, if one of the goals is confidence building 
by adopting what some believe to be the most advanced securities 
transfer system in the world (i.e., Rev. UCC Art. 8),94 then it 
would be important to adopt not only its wording, but to also 
implement it within the same general framework. Since the Rev. 
UCC Art. 8 is implemented as a self-contained piece of legisla-
tion at the state level, in the interests of harmony, it would be 
prudent to follow the same general structure. A provincial se-
curities transfer statute such as the Ontario ST A would best fulfill 
such a role. 
An efficiency-based analysis of CBCA Part VII results in the gen-
eral conclusion that securities transfers are most rationally allocated to 
provincial legislatures. The intensified focus on securities intermediaries 
94 USTA Consultation Paper, supra, n. 58. 
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in the indirect holding system brings renewed attention to the regulation 
of such intennediaries. Regulation of security intermediaries is currently 
accomplished at the provincial level so that it currently makes sense to 
integrate it with the provinces. Similarly, closely related issues such as 
personal property security law are regulated and legislated at the pro-
vincial level. If indirect holdings are to be regulated at the provincial 
level, then efficiency dictates that direct holdings would be best regu-
lated at the provincial level as well so as to result in a single compre-
hensive code of security transfer rather than an uncertain bifurcated one. 
At best, CBCA Part VII would address only corporate securities and 
leave all other securities to the provinces. Such a situation would result 
in unnecessarily duplicative legislation. Finally, if the goal of harmo-
nization is to be more accurately realized, then it is necessary to import 
not only the wording of the UCC but also the general framework in 
which it is implemented. All of these considerations generally suggest 
that the most efficient allocation of responsibility is to the provinces. 
From a historical perspective, it seems that the CBCA Part VII provisions 
were intended to fill a void left due to the lack of relevant provincial 
legislation at the time. Now that relevant and more efficient provincial 
legislation is soon to be in place, it may be no longer necessary for the 
CBCA to fill that void. 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS ON FUTURE ACTION FOR CBCA 
The foregoing analysis has come to the conclusion that it is more 
efficient for CBCA to allocate responsibility for securities transfers to 
provincial legislatures. In the analysis of how such a move might be 
accomplished, certain factors may either facilitate or complicate the 
allocation of securities transfer rules from the CBCA to provincial leg-
islatures. 
(a) Factors Facilitating the Allocation to Provinces 
The first factor facilitating the allocation provincial legislatures is 
the ease of severance of the current provisions from the CBCA. As 
discussed, the current CBCA Part VII provisions operate at two distinct 
levels: administrative provisions and direct holding I negotiability pro-
visions. The policy rationale behind the administrative provisions is 
merely to provide support to the infrastructure that assists shareholders 
in evidencing their ownership interest and exercising their rights. The 
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policy rationale with respect to the direct holding I negotiability provi-
sions is to enhance economic efficiency by legitimizing existing market 
practices, thereby increasing certainty. 
The differing policy rationales behind these provisions suggest that 
they address different goals and are thus easily severable from each other 
since they do not depend on each other. Indeed, prior to the amendments 
in the mid- l 970s, the Canadian federal corporate law statutes did in fact 
exist without the provisions to be severed. Removing the direct holding 
I negotiability provisions will not be the removal of inextricably inter-
twined provisions in the CBCA. The transfer provisions of the CBCA 
comprise a fairly self-contained code that exists to promote market 
efficiencies, a rationale that is quite far removed from the more standard 
corporate rationales in the rest of the statute. In essence, removing the 
present direct holding provisions from the CBCA merely reverses the 
amendments of the mid-l 970s. These amendments have since been 
superseded by potentially more modem mechanisms of promoting ef-
ficient market trades. As was analyzed earlier in this article, the relatively 
small amount of case law surrounding these provisions suggests that 
they are not the subject of high volume litigation. This further affirms 
the notion that their removal will not necessarily have a huge negative 
impact on the actual market.9' 
The second factor facilitating the allocation of responsibility to the 
provinces is the fact that the indirect holding system, including its co-
existence with the direct holding system, is nothing new. The indirect 
holding system and book-based securities are a commercial reality and 
have been so for quite some time now. In addition, the current provincial 
securities transfer legislation are all based on the USTA, which in tum 
is based on Rev. UCC Art. 8. Rev. UCC Art. 8 has been in place since 
the mid- l 990s and was specifically drafted to handle the issue of indirect 
holdings. The prevalence of indirect holding as an established commer-
cial practice along with a proven, reputable system of legislation should 
provide the federal government with a strong degree of comfort that the 
transfer of corporate securities will be handled well by the new provincial 
legislation. 
"' However, it is worth remembering that the new direct holding provisions under the Ontario 
ST A uses the term "protected purchaser" as opposed to "bona fide purchaser". Thus, the 
new statutory provisions potentially render the previously decided case law obsolete. 
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Third, based on the dominance of the indirect holding system and 
the comments of the securities industry, it is clear that there is high 
demand for legislation relating to the transfer of book-based securities. 
This is highly significant given how the USTA is essentially an attempt 
to transplant U.S. law into Canada. Some scholarly studies suggest that 
the effectiveness of a legal transplant is strongly determined by whether 
or not the recipient jurisdiction is familiar and receptive to the imported 
legal concepts: 
Our key argument is that legality is largely a function of the demand for law. 
Only if demand for law is high, will there be voluntary compliance and will a 
society invest in the legal institutions necessary for upholding the public legal 
order[ ... ] Laws that are compatible with the preexisting social norms are more 
likely to be well received and thus effectuated. We therefore suggest that trans-
plants may work, if they are adapted, or if the population is already well familiar 
with the basic principles of these laws.96 
Since the Canadian market is already quite familiar with the indirect 
holding system (which is the basis of the vast volume of its publicly 
traded securities) and demand for legislation is fairly high, the above 
scholarly study suggests that transplantation of Rev. UCC Art. 8 to the 
Canadian legal system is likely to have a high probability of success. 
(b) Factors Complicating the Allocation to Provinces 
It is clear enough that CBCA Part VII provisions addressing the 
administrative infrastructure (e.g., providing for a shareholder register, 
etc.) should be left in the CBCA because such provisions do not relate 
to the issues of securities transfer (i.e., direct and indirect holdings). The 
question is what one must do to address the potential conflict between 
direct holding systems and whether one addresses the lack of any indirect 
holding provisions at the federal level. 
The single most important factor that complicates the allocation of 
securities transfer responsibility is the fact that the provinces and terri-
tories have not all implemented or enacted securities transfer legislation. 
This inconsistency among provinces and territories places the CBCA 
Part VII provisions in a fairly difficult position at the moment. If the 
CBCA were to remove its direct holding provisions and allow the On-
tario ST A and Alberta ST A to handle the issue, a gap would exist for 
""D. Berkowitz, K. Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, ''The Transplant Effect" (2003) 51 Am. 
J. Comp. L. 163 at 189. 
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the provinces and territories that have no securities transfer legislation. 
In other words, the provinces and territories that have no version of the 
USTA enacted would now also have no direct holding provisions with 
respect to federal business corporations because the CBCA would have 
repealed them. 
On the other hand, if the CBCA does not remove its current direct 
holding provisions, then there is the possibility of duplicative and con-
flicting laws with the Ontario STA and Alberta ST A, since these prov-
inces deal with direct holding as well within their securities transfer 
legislation. In short, there would be two sets of direct holding provisions, 
one federal and one provincial. 
(c) Options and Recommendations 
The next part of this article will discuss the various options for 
allocating securities transfer responsibility in light of the complications 
mentioned above. It is assumed that the administrative provisions of 
CBCA Part VII will remain in the CBCA as these provisions properly 
support CBCA policy rationales. The options below relate to possible 
courses of action regarding direct and indirect holding issues. The pos-
sible options include the following: 
• Option 1: Enact a federal STA, with provincial exemptions 
if equivalent in place. In this scenario, the federal government 
would enact a federal version of the UST A. This would ensure 
that the provinces that had not yet enacted securities transfer 
legislation would at least have a comprehensive code for both 
indirect and direct holding of federal corporate securities (though 
there would still be no legislation dealing with non-federal cor-
porate securities in the province). The federal ST A could also 
state that if the province had a substantially similar piece of 
securities transfer legislation in place, then the provincial legis-
lation would prevail. Eventually, if all the provinces and terri-
tories harmonized their legislation to the USTA, the federal STA 
provisions would be moot and could be repealed altogether. 
This general stratagem of using federal law to cover provincial 
gaps and generally receding in favour of provinces is not an 
entirely unfamiliar concept. The recently enacted federal privacy 
legislation, Personal Information Privacy and Electronic Doc-
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uments Act91 ("PIPEDA"), makes use of a similar, though not 
exactly same, concept. PIPEDA has a number of important pro-
visions that protect the privacy of individuals. 
However, PIPED A also states that the Governor in Council, may, 
"if satisfied that legislation of a province that is substantially 
similar to this Part applies to an organization, a class of organi-
zations, an activity or a class of activities, exempt the organiza-
tion, activity or class from the application of this Part in respect 
of the collection, use or disclosure of personal information that 
occurs within that province. ''98 In short, if the federal government 
is satisfied that the province has privacy legislation that is sub-
stantially similar to that of PIPEDA, then it may exempt the 
province from a substantive number of PIPEDA's provisions. 
To date, this provision has already been invoked by the federal 
government. The general privacy legislation of both Alberta and 
British Columbia has already been deemed by the federal gov-
ernment to be "substantially similar".99 The main difference be-
tween PIPED A and the option of a federal ST A is that PIPED A 
does not contemplate completely vacating the privacy area while 
the federal ST A may actually welcome such an action, if part of 
the rationale to implement it is to fill the gap left by provinces 
without securities transfer legislation. 
The disadvantage to this option is that it requires extensive leg-
islation by the federal government. The CBCA Part VII provi-
sions would have to be removed and the federal ST A would have 
to been enacted. One comfort is that the federal ST A would 
already have the pre-existing model of the UST A to draw upon 
and it is unlikely that any substantial deviations would be re-
quired. However, unlike the provincial securities transfer legis-
lation, the federal ST A would have the added complexity of 
drafting and implementing the transition and exemption clauses 
mentioned above. 
97 Personal Information Privacy and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 [PIPED A]. 
•• Ibid., s. 26(2)(b). 
99 See the Canadian Privacy Commissioner, online: <http://www.privcom.gc.ca/legislation/ 
ss...Jndex_e.asp> citing the relevant issues of the Canada Gazette where the proclamations 
were made. 
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The advantage to this option is that it provides maximum cov· 
erage of direct and indirect holdings for corporate securities of 
CBCA companies as well as securities of other business organ· 
izations. It could be fairly said that this reasonably represents the 
most the federal government could do in the face of incomplete 
provincial harmonization. There have been many proposals for 
a single securities regulator with a single securities act for the 
entire country. (For the most recent discussion, see the Wise 
Persons Committee Report 2003).100 If this were to occur then 
one could contemplate a larger merger and coordination of all 
provincial ST As and the federal ST A enacted under this option. 
Ideally, this would result in efficient synergies between both 
level of governments. 
• Option 2: Leave CBCA Part VII with provincial exemption 
if equivalent in place. This scenario envisages that the current 
direct holding provisions of the CBCA Part VII will continue to 
govern unless the province has addressed direct holdings, in a 
manner similar to the UST A, in its own provincial securities 
transfer legislation. This option solves the problem of having 
conflicting direct holding provisions between the CBCA and the 
Ontario I Alberta ST As. However, if a province has not enacted 
any securities transfer legislation, then there will be no gap for 
federal corporate securities since the CBCA Part VII provisions 
will continue to exist for those provinces. 
The disadvantage to this option is that it provides no solution for 
the indirect holdings of federal corporate securities in provinces 
that have not enacted any securities legislation. Arguably, this 
does not deviate from the status quo since, until the Ontario and 
Alberta STAs are in force, there currently is no regime for indi· 
reel holding securities in any province. 
The advantage to this option is that it requires minimal legislative 
action. The provisions of the CBCA are neither being removed 
nor is another separate piece of legislation being drafted. The 
current CBCA would simply make the qualifications mentioned 
above. Furthermore, one might argue that this option is very non· 
100 Committee to Review the Structure of Securities Regulation in Canada, It's Time (Ottawa: 
Department of Finance, 2003). 
44 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [23 B.F.L.R.] 
interventionalist since it does not attempt to impose a federal 
ST A upon a province. 
• Option 3: Wait for provincial harmonization. This scenario 
contemplates that the federal government do nothing until such 
time that all of the provinces have implemented securities trans-
fer legislation similar to the UST A. At that point, the federal 
government would be in a position to completely repeal the 
CBCA Part VII transfer provisions. The advantage to this option 
is that there are no gaps in legislation. The main disadvantage is 
that it may be overly optimistic. If one assumes that the provinces 
will harmonize very quickly then this option is likely best. How-
ever, complete provincial harmonization of legislation would be 
an unprecedented occurrence in Canadian legal history. Thus, 
apprehension over whether this would likely occur in the short 
term may be well founded. If provincial harmonization is not 
forthcoming, then there is again the problem of duplication and 
potential conflict between the legislation of provinces that have 
enacted securities transfer legislation and the direct holding pro-
visions of the CBCA. 
• Option 4: Completely repeal the CBCA transfer provisions 
without reference to provinces. This scenario envisages the 
federal completely vacating the field of securities transfer for the 
provincial legislatures. Ostensibly, this would simply bring the 
CBCA, with respect to securities transfers, to its pre mid- l 970s 
state. There are several significant disadvantages to this ap-
proach. First, it is unclear what effect the repeal would have on 
federal corporate securities certificates already in existence. Is-
sues of retroactivity would have to be addressed. Second, it 
would leave a complete legal vacuum with respect to direct 
holdings of federal corporate securities in provinces that have 
not enacted any securities transfer legislation. This could lead to 
uncertainty and work against the very economic efficiencies that 
prompted the federal government to move in this direction in the 
first place. 
The advantage of this option is that it is relatively easy to imple-
ment since it only requires repeal of the current CBCA Part VII 
transfer provisions. However, if the issue of retroactivity and 
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other ancillary issues are addressed in the CBCA amendments, 
then even this advantage could quiclcly evaporate. Arguably, the 
creation of a legal vacuum may prompt and provide incentive to 
provincial legislatures to enact securities transfer legislation. 
However, this is a risky strategy particularly for provinces where 
trade in securities is not a priority and may, in fact, backfire. 
It is suggested that the optimal choices are options 1 and 2 above. 
The approach of waiting for complete provincial harmonization (option 
3) may be far too optimistic and would leave potentially conflicting 
legislation in place. Completely repealing all of the CBCA Part VD 
transfer provisions (option 4), without regard to the provinces, may be 
simply too drastic a step given the confusion that it can generate. 
Enacting a federal STA with provincial exemptions (option 1) is 
arguably the most complete and comprehensive solution. It ensures that 
there is no conflict with the Ontario STA and the Alberta STA while 
providing a complete code of securities transfer (direct and indirect) for 
provinces that have no securities transfer legislation. Whether or not it 
is ultimately chosen will depend heavily upon the federal government's 
willingness to legislate a comprehensive securities transfer statute with 
intricate provincial exemption provisions. 
On the other hand, leaving the direct holding provisions of CBCA 
Part VIl in place with provincial exemption (option 2) is an easier and 
less intrusive than option l, though less comprehensive. This option 
requires only minimal legislative action in the form of drafting a pro-
vincial exemption for CBCA Part VD. It is also the most flexible of all 
the options since it easily allows the federal government the freedom to 
pursue other options in the future. Whether or not this option is chosen 
will depend on the federal government's willingness to tolerate an in-
complete though flexible measure. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The current provisions of Part VD of the CBCA have an interesting 
history. Their enactment in the mid-l 970s was a response to the market 
practice of treating corporate security certificates as negotiable instru-
ments. These provisions were heavily based on UCC Art. 8, though they 
differed slightly in wording. CBCA Part VD has a comprehensive set of 
provisions regarding the negotiability of federal corporate securities with 
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integrated concepts such as "bona fide purchaser". A review of the case 
law reveals that there have not been many significant judicial consid-
erations of these provisions (both at the federal level and of analogous 
Ontario corporate statute provisions). 
CBCA Part VII operates at two policy rationale levels. At one level, 
CBCA Part VII contains provisions that are administrative and suppor-
tive in nature. These provisions provide the infrastructure that assists 
shareholders in exercising their rights. At another level, CBCA Part VII 
has negotiability provisions that, in the mid- l 970s, supported existing 
market practices, harmonized with important trading partners and helped 
move the law towards a comprehensive code for securities transfer. 
Although CBCA Part VII may have been a pragmatic solution at 
the time of its enactment, it has not kept up with modem times. CBCA 
Part VII only deals with the direct holding system. Currently, the dom-
inant market practice for the transfer of securities is the indirect holding 
system. The indirect holding system is far more efficient since it deals 
with book-based entries rather than the more tedious practice of deliv-
ering physical security certificates. The indirect holding system is, by 
far, the manner in which the vast majority of publicly traded shares are 
held in Canada (as well as the U.S.). 
The U.S. has addressed the dominant practice of indirect holding 
in Rev. UCC Art. 8. Until recently, no Canadian legislation addressed 
indirect holding. However, the CSA drafted the UST A in an attempt to 
address the indirect holding system and to modernize the Canadian 
system. Both Ontario and Alberta have enacted virtually identical se-
curities transfer legislation (which have received royal assent but are not 
yet in force) based upon the UST A. The Ontario ST A removes the direct 
holding provisions in the OBCA (analogous to CBCA Part VII) and 
places them within the ST A. The direct holding provisions are similar 
but the concept of bona fide purchaser is replaced with the concept of 
protected purchaser (which arguably provides more protection to the 
transferee). With respect to indirect holdings, the Ontario STA creates 
a regime whereby indirect holdings are recognized as a security entitle-
ment against a security intermediary. Security transfers are conducted 
by the creation of a security entitlement on one security intermediary's 
books and the elimination of a security entitlement on another security 
-------------~--------------, 
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intermediary's books. An entitlement holder, generally speaking, can 
only assert its security rights against its own intermediary. 
Although the administrative provisions of CBCA Part VII fulfill 
the corporate policy rationale of supporting shareholder rights (by as-
sisting in the creation of an evidentiary scheme), the negotiability pro-
visions do not seem to fulfill any of the traditional goals of corporate 
law. In a broad abstract sense, the negotiability provisions arguably 
promoted the corporate goal of economic efficiency back in the mid-
1970s by legitimating a common market practice. However, if that was 
the case, then that rationale is no longer present since CBCA Part VII 
has not kept up with the dominant indirect holding system. 
The goals of the Ontario I Alberta ST As may seem to be comple-
mentary to those of the CBCA. Both the Ontario I Albert ST As have the 
goal of harmonizing with the U.S. as well as controlling systemic and 
legal risk. This would be consistent with the efficiency goals of the 
CBCA. However, there is the potential for conflict. The CBCA has 
direct holding provisions and the Ontario STA also has direct holding 
provisions (which purport to apply to all securities). Since the Ontario 
STA has introduced new concepts such as "protected purchaser" to its 
legislation, this has the potential of conflicting with older traditional 
concepts in CBCA Part VII. 
In assessing the future role of CBCA Part VII, there are many 
perspectives one could take. Rather than using a constitutional or cate-
gorical analysis, this article proceeds with an efficiency analysis. It 
concludes that the CBCA ought to allow the provinces to legislate in 
relation to both direct and indirect holdings of securities. Indirect holding 
schemes based on Rev. UCC Art. 8 emphasiz.e that the entitlement holder 
may only assert rights against the security intermediary. As a result, the 
jurisdiction that regulates security intermediaries is the most efficient 
one to handle the related issue of indirect holdings. Presently, that would 
be the provincial governments. Similarly, the issue of pledging securities 
as collateral is handled by the provincial government. Since security 
transfers and pledges are closely related issues, again it would be more 
efficient to have a single level of government deal with them together. 
On the other hand, current CBCA Part VII provisions that deal only with 
the administrative issues and not with direct I indirect holding issues 
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should be left in the CBCA as these provisions properly provide the 
infrastructure for corporate law matters. 
Moreover, securities consist of more than just corporate securities 
of federally incorporated companies. They consist of provincial corpo-
rate securities as well as non-corporate securities. Thus, any federal 
attempt to legislate regarding indirect holdings would necessarily be 
incomplete because presumably a hypothetical CBCA indirect holding 
scheme would only apply to federal corporate securities. This would 
necessitate that the provinces legislate a parallel statute dealing with all 
other types of securities. This would lead to confusing and unnecessarily 
duplicative legislation. Finally, if the goal is harmonization with the 
UCC model, then it would be advisable to follow not only the same 
wording but also the same framework. The UCC contemplated a separate 
and self-contained securities transfer code enacted at the state level. 
Instead, Canada enacted it at the federal level and integrated it within 
its corporate statute. In time, this departure from the original framework 
would become apparent as integration with the provinces on key issues 
and dealing with non-corporate security issues became more difficult. 
Presently, allocating responsibility for securities transfer to the 
provinces is difficult because not all of the provinces have enacted 
securities transfer legislation. If the CBCA removes its direct holding 
provisions, then there may be a gap for provinces without securities 
transfer legislation. On the other hand, if the CBCA leaves its direct 
holding provisions as is, then there may be potential conflict with prov-
inces that have enacted securities transfer legislation. 
There are four suggested options: 
• enact a federal STA (based on UST A) with provincial exemp-
tions for provinces with functional equivalent of federal ST A; 
• leave CBCA Part VII direct holding with provincial exemptions 
for provinces with direct holding provisions similar to UST A; 
• do nothing and wait until all provinces harmonize; or 
• remove all CBCA Part VII direct holding provisions. 
The latter two options are not very appealing. Waiting for the 
provinces to harmonize may be too optimistic and can result in conflict-
ing legislation in the interim. Removing all CBCA Part VII direct hold-
ing provisions may be too drastic and could lead to uncertainty. The two 
GOVT. RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRANSFER OF SECURITIES 49 
former options are optimal. Enacting a federal ST A is the most compre-
hensive solution with no gaps though it requires the willingness to 
commit to a detailed legislative solution. Leaving the CBCA direct 
holding provisions with a provincial exemption is the least committal 
solution and has the advantage of being flexible and leaving choices to 
the provinces. It is easier to implement and requires the willingness to 
tolerate an incomplete solution in exchange for future flexibility. In 
either event, both these options at least address the situation in balanced 
manner founded on what is relatively speaking, an efficient approach. 
POSTSCRIPT 
Since this article was written, both the Securities Act (Ontario) and 
Securities Act (Alberta) have been enacted and are now in force. 
